HowMilitarySlaveryFirstOccurred 179
theydiscardedthetribalconnection.Detribalization
unmoored
loyalties
andleftmost
oftheArabianwarriors
floundering,
un-
ableor
unwilling
tofitintothenew
system
of
corpsorganizedby
theAbbasid
regime,
More
important
still,asthefervent
support
oftheAbbasidmovementcooled,the
Abbasidsfoundnobonds
tofallbackon;
they
wereleft"withan
empirepossessing
neither
tribalnorfactionaltiestoholdit
together.
’’75
Putmore
strongly,
"the
empire
fell
apart
becauseithadneverexisted.
’’76
TheAbbasidinsistenceondirectcontrolalienatedmany,
and
again,especially
the
Arabian tribesmen.Severe
political
divi-
sionsfollowed,withtheleadersinseveral
regionsbreaking
away
fromthe
caliphate.
This
process
of
segmentation
furtherin-
creased
Abbasidconcernwith
loyalty
anddirectcontrol.Asre-
bellions
multiplied
and
regions
broke
away,
therulersmadeever
more
desperate
effortstofind
loyalsupporters.
Crisis in
Military
Manpower,
195-98/811-14. Two
generations
after
gaining
the
caliphate,
theAbbasidscouldno
longerrely
on
thedescendantsofthe
marginal
areasoldierswhohadbrought
themto
power.
The
Khurasanis,
bothArabianandIranian,set-
tleddownorbecameunruly.The
civilwarof195-98/811-14
betweenthebrothersal-Amnand
al-Ma’mfinmade
thisfact
clear,
just
astheearlierwarof64-74/684-93had.
AI-Amfnreliedmostlyonthedescendantsofthetroopswho
hadwonin132/750,knownastheAbn’,the"coreand
nucleus"
oftheAhlBaghdl(PeopleofBaghdad)who"bore
thebruntof
the
struggle"againstal-Ma’mfin.7The
Abn’"werethe
mainstay
ofAmin
throughout
thewhole
struggle,
fromthefirstclash
up
tohis
very
death.
’’78
Arabiansdidnotplayalarge
roleinthecivil
war,
butinsofaras
theyfought,they
aidedal-Amin.
9
They
did
not
cooperate
wellwiththeAbn’,nordid
they
take
advantage
of
this last
opportunity
to
salvage something
of their earlier
power.
8
AI-Amin’s
troopsexemplified
whathappens
totheoff-
75.Crone,
p.128.
76.Cahen,
"Body
Politic,"
p.143.
77.Ayalon,"Reforms,"
pp.
5-6.
78.
Ibid.,p.10.
79.
Ibid.,p.13.
- Ibid.,
pp.21-22.