Slave Soldiers and Islam_ The Genesis of a Military System - Daniel Pipes

HowMilitarySlavery

FirstOccurred 181

areasoldiers.
Having

just

beatenthe oldsoldiersinacivilwar,

al-Ma’mfinwaswell
placed

torecruitwhomeverhechose;and

living

inKhurasan,hehad

easy

accessto

large

numbersofthe

finest
marginal

areasoldiers.

Althoughthemawlastatus

in198/214had

only

ashadowofits

former
importance,

al-Ma’mfinnodoubthadsomeideaofthe

roleithad
played

in

supplyingmarginal

areasoldiersto

Mar-

wanideraarmies.In
servilitylay

thekernelofamethodof

re-

cruitmentwith

whichal-Ma’mnsurmountedthe

hostility

ofthe

Baghdadpopulace,

the

power

ofhis

generals,

andtheweakness

ofhisold
soldiery:

enslavementofsoldiersenabled

al-Ma’m0n

torestructurehisarmy.

His

needs,

his

location,

andthemawla

precedent

inducedhimtoturntoCentralAsiatoenslavemargi-

nalareasoldiersinthemannerdocumentedin

chapter

5.

First,

unlikeMarwaniderauseofmawlas,Abbasidrecruit-

mentof
military

slavesdoesfitthe

general

Islamicate

pattern;

done
by

thecentral

government

(individual

soldiersrecruited

the
mawlas),

it

brought

aliensintothe

army(mawlas

wereMus-

lim
subjects).

TheAbbasid

army

wasnot

triballyorganized

and

thuslackedtheremarkable
autonomy

ofArabian

period

forces;

itcouldresistneithertherecruitmentofnewsoldiers

northe

establishmentofnewcorps.

Second,whereas

only

3 to 4

percent

ofthe
population

ofDfiral-Islfimin64/684wasMuslim,halfthe

population

in Iran hadconvertedto Islam

by

205/820, and

elsewhere

up

toa

quarter

haddoneso.

84

Thewithdrawal

from

power

and

public

affairs,whichcharacterizedMuslimpopula-

tionshenceforth,began

inIranatthistime:theincreaseinthe

proportion

of Muslims meant that

they

no

longer

felt so

threatened

by

thenon-Muslims

livingamong

them,anddisap-

pointment

in

publicaffairsbecame

acute asrivalleadersin-

creasinglysplit

the

umma,

the

caliphate

lostitsluster

(especially

amongShVis),andthejihdwarsofexpansion

hadended,tobe

replacedby

internecine

fighting.

TheAbbasidshadcarriedhigh

hopes,

but

aftersomedecadesthey

disillusioned

manygroups,

including

the

army,

the

pious,

and the remoter

provincials.

Theseturnedinward,andin

doing

soinitiateda

long-standing

pattern.

84.

Iran:Bulliet,p.44.Elsewhere:ibid.,pp.83,97,

109.