Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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an obligation to the security of South Korea and should have been able to

put their personal differences aside to work for the common good. Neither

did, and the relationship remained bad and even grew worse. Perhaps if

Wickham had accepted the first meeting in December, , the two could

have worked more closely together, and Wickham might have had more

influence on Chun’s actions. But by February it was too late.

This relationship grew worse after an incident on the Yongsan Golf

Course in early spring. Chun, by now a three-star general, had arrived at

Yongsan for lunch and a round of golf. In those days, since he was concerned

about his own safety, Chun traveled with an impressive number of body-

guards. When the minister of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, or

other senior Korean officers used this facility, they arrived with a single aide

and driver. Chun, in contrast, had an entourage fit for a king. At one point

he had a security detail and personal staff of almost twenty people, and sev-

eral cars were necessary to transport them all. General Wickham either saw

or was told of the size of this group and apparently was upset by the osten-

tatious display. He directed that Chun’s large detail not be allowed to use

the clubhouse and other facilities until such time as they were reduced to a

level consistent with other officers of his rank and position. Wickham made

it clear that Chun himself was welcome, though with a reduced staff. This

was a reasonable request, but either through misunderstanding or an un-

willingness to comply, Chun was infuriated. He and his group left in a big

huff, never to return. The feelings between Wickham and Chun had reached

a new low point.

Chun Becomes KCIA Director

In March and early April, , the South Korean economic picture began

to deteriorate. There were violent strikes involving miners along the east

coast, and we began to receive reports that indicated the military might be

having second thoughts about the liberal direction of the political process.

The relaxation on political activity had resulted in some inflammatory talk

from the opposition, and the military began to warn of “instability.” Korea

was still under martial law, though at a reduced level. Control of the media

had lessened, but some censorship still existed. The embassy had urged the

Korean government to lift martial law and establish a timetable for direct

elections, but without success. Finally, student protests continued, particu-

larly over martial law, even though these were mainly confined to campuses

and were generally nonviolent.^5