Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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Gleysteen Meets with Chun Again

By early May, , demonstrations had grown both in number of partici-

pants and frequency. There were reports that the police might not be able

to handle these protests by themselves and that consideration was being

given to using military forces in a back-up role. The U.S. government was

especially concerned with these reports and instructed Ambassador

Gleysteen to convey American concerns to the Korean authorities. By now,

although we still dealt formally with the Choi government, the embassy

decided to deal directly with Chun as well since he was the actual power.

This was a measure of Chun’s success to this point, and even the embassy

Political Section did not object. In response to his instructions, therefore,

Gleysteen arranged another meeting with Chun, this time for May .^8

From the American perspective, this meeting went much better than the

one in December, .^9 Gleysteen had been receiving regular reports from

Bob Brewster concerning his contacts with Chun, and some of Brewster’s

optimism may have rubbed off on the ambassador. Chun listened closely to

the ambassador’s concerns and replied in a confident and measured tone.

He said that the situation was serious but certainly not critical. Military force

would be used only as a last resort, he said, and expressed his personal opin-

ion that it would not be necessary at all. Chun blamed the unrest on a small

number of radical elements and seemed to imply that he intended to treat

the expected demonstrations with moderation. His body language and de-

meanor in no way suggested that a crisis was at hand.

Gleysteen then expressed the well-known American views that only by

allowing the people to participate in their own government could South

Korea enjoy true stability and that the key to quieting potential unrest was

to convince the demonstrators that progress was being made toward that

goal. He asked that a timetable for democracy be established and adhered

to. He also urged Chun not to crack down on opposition politicians, stress-

ing that it was one thing to take action against a small number of true radi-

cals but quite another to risk alienating the many moderate students who

formed the majority of the demonstrators. Finally, Gleysteen cautioned

against taking any actions that would cause the general populace to join

the crowds.

In contrast to their previous meeting, this one ended fairly cordially. Fol-

lowing Chun’s departure, Gleysteen reported to Washington that he now be-

lieved that the situation was under control and that there was a good chance

that the upcoming demonstrations would be dealt with in a moderate