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as an ideal form of government. He mentioned the long friendship and close
relationship between the Korean and American people, and the importance
of maintaining those close ties in the future. Despite these close ties and the
many similarities between us, however, there were also differences. The
United States, for example, enjoyed secure borders, with Canada to the north
and Mexico to the south. This situation was quite different in South Korea,
with a hostile and well-armed, fully deployed enemy force only a few miles
from Seoul. Because of this important difference, he explained, Korea could
not afford the type of continuing internal friction and political fragmenta-
tion that might be acceptable in other countries. It would be irresponsible
to allow the country to become unstable in the name of political freedom,
especially if that freedom invited the North to exploit the situation. No re-
sponsible officer could allow such a thing to happen if he had the means to
prevent it.
Roh then made an analogy. “Suppose,” he said, “you are holding in your
hands a large number of diamonds. Some of these diamonds are real, but
some are not, they are only glass. How do you tell the difference? Only an
expert can know immediately, but with time and practice one can learn
enough to recognize the true diamonds. Do not be fooled by false diamonds,”
he warned. The point of this analogy was that, given time, the U.S. govern-
ment would be able to recognize and presumably appreciate the real lead-
ers in Korea. I understood this to be a reference to the Class and younger
group that he represented, who were the “true diamonds.” I assumed the
“false diamonds” were either the former army leaders or perhaps opposi-
tion politicians such as Kim Dae Jung, although Roh did not specify.
This meeting lasted more than an hour. The impression I had upon de-
parture was of a composed and rational officer who was not unreasonable
but was strongly committed to maintaining stability. He certainly would not
let the internal situation deteriorate past the present situation. Also, the
apparent increased alert status indicated to me that some sort of use of
military forces was probable in the near future.
Returning to the embassy, I drafted a report to my Washington headquar-
ters summarizing Roh’s remarks and adding my personal observations con-
cerning the increased alert status. I also stated unequivocally that, in my
professional judgment, the military was fully prepared to use all resources
at its command to maintain domestic stability, including active army forces.
By the time I finished, it was well after duty hours. Had I waited for embassy
clearance, the report would have had to be coordinated with the Political
Section, which probably would have delayed its transmission. I believed that