• Washington needed the information and analysis immediately, so I sent it
on my own authority.
The report was read with great interest both within the embassy and in
Washington. Colonel Blottie scheduled a meeting with General Roh as a
result of my report, apparently in order to form his own opinion. My report
was somewhat controversial, possibly because the ambassador had sent a
rather more optimistic assessment to Washington following his meeting
with Chun. Blottie’s feeling after his meeting with Roh was similar to my
own—the situation was reaching a critical point, and the military would
not let it go much further without stepping in. Thus, by the middle of May,
there was some division of opinion on the American side concerning the
likelihood of the use of military force. The embassy, particularly the Politi-
cal Section, considered it less likely; the military attachés, more likely.
Why did General Roh ask to meet with me, an official somewhat down
the hierarchy in the embassy? My Korean-language skills were undoubtedly
part of the explanation. Further, I had a good reputation with the Koreans
as a hardworking attaché who understood their country’s situation better
than most. Also, Colonel Lee or Col. Kim Jin Young, who was extremely close
to Rho, may have recommended me as a reliable and useful channel.
Wickham Meets with Chun AgainOn May Generals Wickham and Chun met again.^12 Chun now blamed
the student demonstrations and general unrest on North Korean clandes-
tine activities. Exactly what these activities were was never specified. He
implied that the situation was very serious and that North Korea might very
well be preparing to attack at any time.
Since the U.S. side had access to the most accurate intelligence informa-
tion on North Korea, and General Wickham was briefed on that situation
almost every morning, he directly challenged Chun’s statement. There were
no signs that an attack was imminent, Wickham responded. He then stated
the U.S. position that continued progress toward democracy and political
liberalization was the best means of deterring North Korea and ensuring
stability in the ROK. The meeting ended without either side making much
of an impression on the other’s point of view.
Indeed, by this time the relationship between Chun and Wickham had
deteriorated to a point where neither man had much influence on the other.
Wickham’s report of this latest meeting centered on Chun’s pessimistic
assessment of the domestic situation and his fixation on a North Korean