•
special warfare troops were being blamed. The same morning U.S. Forces
Korea received a similar call from the U.S. Air Force base at Kwangju. Later
in the day other reports began to trickle in that indicated that the situation
in Kwangju was quite different from Seoul.^9
By midday on Tuesday, May , rumors were flying thickly. The embassy
and USFK had made inquiries of the Korean military authorities but were
unable to get any reliable information as to the true situation. In the after-
noon I dropped by unannounced at the office of a Korean Army lieutenant
colonel who was a native of Kwangju and had formerly been on the staff of
Chun Doo Hwan. This officer took me aside, and we walked outside together
to the parking lot, where he told me what was happening in Kwangju. Ear-
lier he had called his home there and had received a firsthand report from
his parents. They had said the situation was terrible and that the special
warfare soldiers had lost control. His parents had seen several bodies, in-
cluding one almost on their own doorstep. He told me that the Ministry of
National Defense and official ROK military sources were concealing this
information from U.S. officials and were downplaying the extent of the prob-
lem. He also said there were other riots and violence in the cities of Mokpo
and Naju. I had known this officer well for several years and believed him to
be trustworthy and truthful. His close association with Chun meant that
he was taking a big chance in giving me this information. “Please have your
government get this stopped,” he pleaded. I promised I would do my best
and immediately drove back to the embassy.
Even by late on the twentieth, we were unsure of the extent of the trag-
edy in Kwangju.^10 Despite my report, which was given directly to Col. Don
Blottie and Bob Brewster as soon as I returned, there was some disbelief that
things could really be that bad. It was the next day before the true dimen-
sions of what had happened were fully accepted.^11 By then, of course, it was
already too late to influence the situation.
On the morning of May , I proposed to Colonel Blottie that I go per-
sonally to Kwangju to assess the situation and see what we could do to help.
We had arranged for a U.S. military aircraft to fly me into the U.S. air base,
and from there I would try to enter the city, which was blocked off by ROK
Army forces. This mission was given some consideration but eventually dis-
approved by Gleysteen, who was concerned about the danger. To me, it was
just part of being a soldier and certainly no more dangerous than what I
had experienced previously in Vietnam, but I respected the ambassador’s
wishes.^12 Soon thereafter the embassy ordered a total evacuation of all
American citizens from Kwangju.