• Activities in WashingtonWashington was slow to respond to events in Kwangju. Part of the prob-
lem was that the embassy was late to react and report on events there, but
the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus was also preoccupied with events in Iran,
where the holding of American hostages had led recently to an unsuccess-
ful rescue mission, the resignation as secretary of state of Cyrus Vance, and
his replacement by Edmund Muskie.^13 It was not until May that a crisis
team met and an official statement was issued. Muskie chaired the crisis
meeting, and the results were an updated policy statement as follows:
- Advise the Korean government to restore order in Kwangju
through dialogue and minimum use of force in order to avoid
sowing the seeds of wide disorder. - After resolution of the problem in Kwangju, continue pressure for
responsive political structures and broadly based civilian govern-
ment. - Continue signals that the U.S. will defend South Korea from North
Korean attack.^14
These were our new “marching orders,” and both Ambassador Gleysteen
and Gen. John Wickham, who had now returned to Seoul from a trip state-
side, moved quickly to carry them out. General Wickham met with the ROK
military authorities several times and urged that any military steps taken
to reestablish order be carried out with minimum force necessary to accom-
plish the mission.^15 USFK also dispatched AWACS early warning aircraft and
naval units to Korea. Ambassador Gleysteen urged civilian officials to use
restraint and suggested that ROK government leaders apologize for the ex-
cessive use of force.^16 Since such an act would be a direct admission that
they were responsible for the deaths at Kwangju, however, such an apology
was never seriously considered.
Because of the slow response to the terrible events in Kwangju, none of
the actions taken by the U.S. government saved any lives. Most of our ac-
tivities now were designed to assist the Korean government in its efforts to
reestablish order without further bloodshed.