Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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The 20th Division Controversy

Most of the civilian casualties at Kwangju occurred at the hands of the

Special Warfare Command troops in the first day or two following full mar-

tial law. By direction of the ROK government, these units had never been

under CFC control. Although these troops were highly trained for the

behind-the-lines operations directed at North Korea and, therefore, should

logically have been under CFC authority, the Korean leaders had consistently

resisted such suggestions. Quite frankly these forces were considered by most

serious Korea-watchers to be earmarked for political-type activities such as

anticoup protection. Also, they were often among the first units called out

during martial law. The special-warfare commander was always personally

approved by the president as were the heads of the Defense Security Com-

mand and Capital Defense Command. In  these commanders were all

close associates of Chun Doo Hwan.

The th Division was a different story. This was a CFC division, although

some of its elements had been removed from CFC control during /. It

now appeared that Korean authorities intended to use this division to re-

store order in Kwangju. Because of General Wickham’s constant and con-

tinuing protests over the unauthorized movement of CFC forces during /

, the ROK military was now extremely careful to consult with the U.S. side

regarding the use of the th Division. This presented the Americans with

a real dilemma.

The th Division was one of the few units trained in riot-control proce-

dures, which in theory meant that its utilization in Kwangju would result

in fewer civilian casualties. Since minimum loss of life was our objective,

this was a very important consideration. Certainly the th’s use would be

preferable to the special-warfare units; even the Korean military had no

desire to use these forces again.

In later official statements on this, the U.S. government maintained that

it had no power to refuse the use of the th Division because, under the

terms of the CFC charter, either country could withdraw its own forces upon

notification—no approval was necessary or required.^17 This is technically

and legally true, but in this case my recollection is that we participated very

much in the decision process.

Indeed, I believe that it was the preplanned intention of Chun and his

followers to involve the United States as much as possible in the events in

Kwangju. As a result, the same Korean military authorities who a day or

two before were concealing information from us now were eager to share