• every detail concerning the th Division’s movements and operational
plans. They went so far as to directly ask the U.S. leaders if they objected
to use of the th. After consultations with Washington, both General
Wickham and Ambassador Gleysteen agreed to its deployment.
I do not mean to imply in any way that the American side “ordered” or
“approved” this decision, but it has always seemed to me that, in later at-
tempts to explain this issue, we tried to hide behind technical and legal pro-
visions of the CFC charter, when ethically and morally we were obligated to
explain this situation more frankly to the Korean people. The fact was that
we were consulted in great detail on this issue and reached the same deci-
sion, although perhaps more reluctantly, than ROK authorities.
Attempts at NegotiationDespite the movement of the th Division to Kwangju and its ongoing
preparation to retake the city, the U.S. Embassy was still actively trying to
facilitate a negotiated settlement. An informal citizen’s committee comprised
of local leaders had been formed in that town, and Ambassador Gleysteen
was trying to arrange a meeting between this group and martial-law au-
thorities.^18 The embassy’s Political Section believed that such an approach
might succeed; indeed, the citizen’s committee appeared to have been able
to calm the city to some extent. It appeared at one point that such a meet-
ing was possible, but this apparently fell through at the last moment over
procedural details.
In another effort to defuse the situation and also to ensure that Ameri-
can views reached the people of Kwangju, a series of leaflets were prepared.
These fliers appealed for calm and restraint, urging a negotiated settlement
to the crisis. The original plan had been to drop these leaflets over Kwangju
by U.S. military helicopters; however, martial-law authorities objected at the
last minute, citing airspace control and safety problems. Instead, they offered
to drop the leaflets using ROK military aircraft. They never carried out this
promise and actually actively helped spread rumors that the United States
had approved the use of not only the th Division but also the Special
Warfare Command units.^19 This was untrue, except as within the context
of the th Division decision. Unfortunately these false statements were not
aggressively countered, a mistake that sowed the seeds of future anti-Ameri-
can sentiment.
The day before the ROK Army reentered Kwangju, Ambassador Gleysteen
was asked indirectly by those resistors who were still occupying the provin-