Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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cial capitol if he would consent to act as a negotiator between them and the

martial-law authorities. This was considered but eventually rejected by the

ambassador because the ROK leaders had indicated that it was inappropri-

ate for a person in Gleysteen’s position to be so directly involved in what they

considered an internal Korean matter.^20 Some embassy members, includ-

ing myself, were disappointed that Gleysteen did not pursue this matter more

vigorously. Of course, the Kwangju incident was an “internal” matter, but

from a practical standpoint we had been closely involved in similar “inter-

nal” matters since / and had an obligation to do whatever we could to

halt further bloodshed. Unfortunately the decision stood, and the army re-

entered Kwangju the next morning, resulting in more casualties on both

sides. This last fighting in the city was officially described as “well conducted”

and with “light casualties”; in reality the struggle was fierce and numerous

people were killed.

In my almost forty years of experience in dealing with Korea, the events

in Kwangju of May, , generate the saddest memories. Many times in

the years to follow I wondered how we could have reacted differently and

possibly had a better result. Clearly most of the blame for this terrible trag-

edy rests with Chun Doo Hwan and his martial-law group as well as a weak

and easily manipulated ROK civilian government. But we Americans also

deserve part of the blame. We should have acted more forcefully, especially

at certain critical points. In the months following the / incident, we had

an opportunity to act boldly, for the Chun group lacked legitimacy with the

Korean people and with many in the government—even in the army. In-

stead, we tried to influence the situation through diplomacy and reason, but

we were dealing with a people who only understood power and forcefulness.

They had no qualms about twisting the Korean-American relationship,

which to this point had been the strongest in the world, to their own ad-

vantage. After Kwangju, the relationship between South Korea and the

United States was never the same.

Aftermath of Kwangju

Following the restoration of ROK government authority at Kwangju, the

U.S. Embassy staff met to evaluate the new situation. As usual, there was

some disagreement about what course our policy should now take. Al-

though the final decisions would be made in Washington, our embassy

evaluation and recommendations would be carefully considered in that

process; therefore, these meetings were considered very important.