• There had been occasional differences of opinion as to how to deal with
the new group of self-appointed leaders of South Korea. In the past these
disagreements had tended to be between the embassy and USFK, with the
embassy focused on human rights and development of democracy and USFK
concerned more about security posture and countering the North Korean
threat. Following Kwangju, however, the division fell not so much along
these lines, but more along age groups. The older embassy and USFK offi-
cials, who were relatively more senior in position and influence, seemed
resigned to the fact that Chun and his group had successfully taken power,
that despite our many attempts to urge a moderate course of action, we had
failed. This group believed we now had few viable options remaining. Re-
luctantly, they were prepared to deal with Chun as the existing power.
The younger working-level staff members tended to be less analytical in
their thinking and more emotional. They felt that there was still time to
oppose Chun effectively if the embassy could develop a sound plan of ac-
tion and convince Washington to aggressively support such a plan. We be-
gan to work on the details, but events were moving quickly.
On May Ambassador Gleysteen sent his own evaluation to Washing-
ton.^21 This message essentially stated the obvious—that a small group of
army officers had taken power step by step and that Korea was now under
what amounted to a military occupation. He recounted in some detail ear-
lier and unsuccessful efforts to persuade this group to follow a more demo-
cratic path. Gleysteen expressed his opinion that these efforts were totally
discounted because the group had determined that the United States had
no real options but to acquiesce—we would complain but take no real ac-
tion. This appraisal was sent to Washington before the working-level em-
bassy staff could put together a plan of action, and the result was to reinforce
the position of the senior staff, who were now prepared to deal with Chun.
Therefore, when the alternative plan was developed, there was a strong
suspicion that it might already be too late.
Basically this draft plan had seven action elements designed to show in
no uncertain terms where the U.S. government stood. First, we would ag-
gressively censor and disavow Chun and his followers. If the U.S. govern-
ment stood apart and did not support the / group, we believed, it would
have a great influence. There were many anti-Chun groups within South
Korea, and together they might gather strength if given support from the
U.S. side. Obviously this would have been more effective earlier, but still it
was not too late.
Second, instead of constantly complaining about press censorship and