•
the continuing distortion of the American position, we would take indepen-
dent action to get our message directly to the Korean people. Many of us
had a wide and influential network of Korean friends and associates who
could be approached independently and given the message that the United
States did not support Chun and would support an open and fair election.
We had the capability to deliver leaflets and handbills independently, but we
instead depended on the martial-law authorities and official government
outlets to deliver a message that was directly against their own interests and
then complained when they failed to pass it along to the people.
Third, we would refuse any further contacts with Chun and his group.
Instead, we actually upgraded these contacts, both in frequency and the level
at which we met (as I will discuss soon). Every time one of these meetings
occurred, it appeared to the Korean people that we were collaborating closely
with the / group.
Fourth, every time a distortion concerning our true policy appeared, we
would immediately counter it. According to an old proverb, “bad news does
not improve with age.” Yet in many cases we let distortions of our position
remain unchallenged. We also failed to keep an accurate account of these
false stories and, by the summer of , had lost almost any official record
of exactly what tales were being spread. Even the most ridiculous and un-
believable account will eventually gain some credibility if no one denies it,
yet this was the situation we allowed to happen. It was not until that
the U.S. government officially rebutted stories of American support for
Chun’s actions in .^22
Fifth, we would immediately withdraw both Ambassador Gleysteen and
General Wickham from Korea, at least on a temporary basis, if not replace
them altogether. This was not meant to be a criticism of their handling of
the situation, for they were both good, capable, and honorable men who had
tried to do the best they could under difficult conditions. By withdrawing
them, however, a clear signal would be sent that we were opposed to Chun
and his methods, and ordinary Koreans would know where we stood.
Sixth, we would take every opportunity in our contacts within the inter-
national community to censor Chun for his distortions of the American po-
sition, the imposition of martial law, and the events at Kwangju. For most
of the time following Kwangju, our policy toward Chun was not even un-
derstood well within the international community in Seoul or by their gov-
ernments at home. We had unrestricted access to these people, yet we did a
poor job at mobilizing any opposition to Chun within the rest of the foreign
diplomatic community.