• Lastly, we should actively support the opposition political figures. To some
extent this was done; however, much of our concern was expressed outside
of Korea and tended to be concentrated only on Kim Dae Jung, who had
powerful support abroad, particularly in the United States and Japan. The
idea was not to support one particular individual, but the opposition as a
whole as an alternative to Chun, with the objective of free elections.
None of these options were adopted, or as far as I know even presented,
to the ambassador, much less forwarded to Washington.^23 Instead, a series
of policy meetings began in Washington at the end of May and continued
into late June.^24 These meetings were ultimately unsatisfactory at develop-
ing any significant policy changes. The Carter administration did not want
to send any signals that would imply support for Chun and the generals,
yet it was reluctant to take the type of firm actions that were necessary to
express direct opposition. Eventually it decided to take a “cool and aloof”
public stance while at the same time privately urging Chun to resume con-
stitutional reform and move toward democratic elections.
A major reason that these meetings produced such a mild and ineffec-
tive result was the manner in which they were conducted. Because any
decision on our Korea policy would necessarily involve security, foreign
policy, economic, and other considerations, several departments of the gov-
ernment were involved. Although the State Department had the lead role
in determining the agenda and chairing the meetings, the Defense Depart-
ment actually played the dominant role. Other departments and agencies
such as Commerce and the CIA were also involved. I had participated pre-
viously in many of these interagency meetings. Because of the different
viewpoints and concerns of each agency, I had little confidence that they
would reach a satisfactory result. The customary approach was that, when
one agency objected to a particular course of action, it was usually “wa-
tered down.” The outcome was what we called the “lowest common denomi-
nator” solution, which is the option to which the fewest people objected and
that was the least controversial. This is what happened in the aftermath of
Kwangju, and it resulted in a continued weak and ineffective Korea policy.
Gleysteen Meets Chun after KwangjuFollowing instructions, Ambassador Gleysteen met with Chun Doo Hwan
at least twice in June, .^25 At the first meeting early in the month,
Gleysteen told Chun that the United States had great concern over events
since full martial law had been declared and suggested that some sort of