Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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statement of regret over the events at Kwangju should be issued. At the

second meeting he presented American views on the best way to recon-

cile relations between South Korea and the United States. These were to

end martial law and to move toward political liberalization and elections,

which were by now well-known suggestions to the Korean side. Gleysteen

also raised for the first time his concern that it would be difficult to sus-

tain the previously strong security and economic relationship between

our two countries without progress on domestic Korean political issues.

He further complained about misinformation that had been broadcast

concerning the American role at Kwangju and the anti-Americanism that

had resulted. Chun downplayed the anti-Americanism issue, blaming it

on a few radicals.

In July Gleysteen met with Chun once more, this time to complain about

misuse of the ROK-U.S. security relationship in order to advance the

general’s own political ambitions. There is no evidence that any of these

meetings resulted in any positive results from the American viewpoint. In

fact, since the American ambassador was now meeting him regularly, they

tended to legitimize Chun’s authority.

Throughout the period, the Carter administration’s interest was diverted

from Korea due to other problems, particularly in the Middle East. A num-

ber of American diplomats had been taken hostage by the regime of the

Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, and this issue consumed the Carter adminis-

tration.^26 Also, the presidential election campaign was heating up, and Re-

publican Ronald Reagan represented a formidable challenge to Carter’s

reelection hopes.^27 It began to take more time to get policy guidance and

answers from Washington on matters concerning Korea, and it was becom-

ing clear that the peninsula was now of less interest than developments in

the Middle East, particularly Iran. Basically we were told to do the best we

could within existing policy guidelines. “Don’t call us; we’ll call you” was

the message from home.

The Second Countercoup Plot

In late June we once again began to hear rumors of a possible countercoup

among some members of the Korean military. This time, the center of the

dissatisfaction was not in the Class  group, which by then had faded from

any position of authority in the army. Instead, it appeared to be a group of

younger officers, including some who were members of the Special War-

fare Command. According to several reports, members of this group felt that