• Neither Gleysteen nor Wickham talked to the right people. The ambas-
sador had a strong staff, including some experienced Korea hands such as
Spence Richardson in the political section and myself. We were infrequently
consulted, except by officials below Gleysteen. General Wickham’s staff was
largely out of the loop. The general ran most of the show himself, even
though he was not knowledgeable about Korea. In addition, he was fre-
quently out of the country, often at critical times. Aware after / that
he was being criticized in Washington, Wickham may have wanted to shore
up his base at home.^30
We also missed some opportunities. Had we had a more focused adminis-
tration in Washington and less-cautious leadership in Korea, we might have
made a stronger attempt to work closely with the military moderates after
the Park assassination, taken a stronger anti-Chun posture immediately af-
ter /, or even as late as the end of May, , in accordance with the
plan suggested by some of the younger embassy members. Clearly the ear-
lier the action had been taken, the better the prospects for its success. Once
Chun had seized control of the army, the chance for early democratization
dimmed considerably. These prospects did not disappear, however, and had
the United States chosen a bolder course, democracy might have blossomed
nearly a decade earlier than it actually did. At the very least the United States
would have communicated its views to the Korean people in a manner that
would have averted many of the hard feelings that linger to this day.