• each country, and other issues (for example, the continuation of the joint
military training exercise Team Spirit).
This study took over a year to produce, and some of the conclusions were
controversial. For instance, the evaluation of the North Korean threat had
not been revised significantly since the army study sponsored by General
Aaron in , some ten years earlier. During those ten years, a lot had
changed on the peninsula. While the North remained a serious military
threat, it was becoming questionable whether its poor economy could in fact
support and sustain a modern war. By using a series of computer projec-
tions and economic models, it became obvious that North Korea could only
continue to maintain its large military machine by further neglecting its
economy. I concluded that, if the current trends continued, by the mid-s
North Korea would probably no longer be able to adequately maintain its
large conventional force.^2 Although this estimate was probably accurate,
what I did not consider or know at the time was that someone in Pyongyang
was probably reaching a similar conclusion and that the seeds of the North
Korean nuclear program were likely being planted as a result.^3 (That issue,
however, is very complicated, and I will discuss it in more detail a little later.)
Besides an updated threat evaluation, there was the matter of the proper
relationship between the ROK and U.S. forces, particularly an examination
of what roles and responsibilities were appropriate for each country. In
the s and s, for example, it was logical, for a number of reasons,
to have a U.S. general exercise operational control over both ROK and U.S.
forces. By the s we had moved to a more integrated and binational com-
mand structure under the CFC arrangement. For the s, I believed a
more modern arrangement was appropriate, with Korea taking the lead in
security matters and the United States moving to a supporting role. The U.S.
strength was in its air power, which was far superior to the North Korean
air forces, and its logistical system, which could deliver the large amounts
of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies necessary to wage war successfully.
The ROK had excellent light infantry, a good defense/industrial base, and a
well-rehearsed strategy for defense. The task at hand was to ensure that each
partner focused on its respective strengths. Later this initiative became
adopted as official policy and was known to the Americans as the “leading
to supporting role” policy.
In addition to focusing on each other’s strengths, the study recommen-
dations called for the South Koreans to take the overall lead in most secu-
rity matters relating to the peninsula, a goal to be accomplished on a gradual
timetable. This meant several first steps were in order. One of these was