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changing the senior member of the United Nations Military Armistice Com-
mission from an American to a Korean general, which was finally acted
upon in .^4 At the time it was mostly a symbolic change, but it is inap-
propriate to my way of thinking to have an American as the senior nego-
tiator at Panmunjom facing the North Koreans. The North did not respond
or formally recognize this change to a “Korean face,” but at least we made
the important point that the Koreans were ultimately in charge of their own
security, with the Americans backing them up—not the other way around.
Another study recommendation was that a Korean general be appointed
as commander of the ground forces component of the CFC. This has also
finally been implemented. It was inappropriate for an American officer to
command the ground forces, which were almost entirely Korean soldiers. I
also proposed that operational control of Korean forces be returned to South
Korea in peacetime, which was not actually carried out until .
At some time in the future, the day may also come when the nationality
of the CFC commander himself is changed from an American to a Korean
general. There are sensitive political considerations involved on both sides
on this issue, but to my way of thinking, South Korea can never move to a
true leading role until this is done. There is no valid military reason to wait
any longer, although there are cogent political and deterrent reasons.
The study also addressed the annual Team Spirit military exercise.
For several years, North Korea had demanded cancellation of Team Spirit,
calling it provocative. Nothing of the sort was true since it was essentially a
defensive type of exercise. The ROK-U.S. side even went so far as to invite
North Korea to send its own observers to Team Spirit in order to verify this
fact, but that government consistently refused. The study recommendation
was that Team Spirit be continued for as long as the ROK and U.S. govern-
ments felt it contributed to security in Korea.^5
Not all of my Pentagon assignment was spent chained to my desk. From
time to time I was able to return to South Korea on business related either
to the study or other policy matters. Also, I worked closely with Wally
Knowles, a longtime fixture in the Pentagon, who was the assistant for Ko-
rea at the time. Wally was an old friend with whom I had worked closely
during my earlier years on the army staff. Most of our collaboration was on
security-consultative-meeting issues, and we made a good team, occasion-
ally traveling to Korea together on meeting-related business.
These visits gave me a good sense of events in Korea, primarily on the
military side, where the Korean-American relationship remained strong
despite the trauma of the / incident and subsequent events. Among