Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

 •   

to go through his command. Also, he expected me to function as a liaison

officer between the embassy and USFK and to keep him and his staff informed

as to what the embassy’s position and strategy were on key issues in which

the views of the State and Defense Departments might differ. Finally, he

wanted to replace, or at least “assist,” the ambassador as my rating officer

for evaluation purposes—in other words, to be directly involved in the an-

nual evaluation of how well I did my job.

It is not easy for a colonel to directly disagree with a four-star general,

but I felt an obligation to do so. At this point I had little expectation of reach-

ing general rank in the army; my primary ambition was simply to do as good

a job as possible in my current assignment. My duty was clear, I explained

to Menetrey, and that was to support the ambassador, who was my direct

boss in South Korea, and the director of the DIA, who was my boss in Wash-

ington. I described our intelligence-reporting channel and explained the

reasons that we required direct field reporting to our headquarters rather

than through USFK. As politely as possible, I refused his request.

General Menetrey was still dissatisfied and subsequently sent a message

to my boss, a three-star general in Washington. Fortunately my boss sup-

ported my position, and I continued to function completely independent of

USFK. Later there were some significant policy disagreements between USFK

and the embassy, and I was happy I was not caught in the middle.

The ROK Presidential Campaign and Election

When I arrived back in Seoul, the big political news was Roh Tae Woo’s call

for free and open elections to determine the next president of South Korea.^4

Roh was Chun Doo Hwan’s designated successor. Initially Chun seemed

determined that Roh would be selected by a sort of electoral college, the

membership of which would be stacked in his favor. On June , however,

Roh announced that the choice would be by popular election. This news was

roundly applauded throughout the country. The U.S. government also was

delighted, for it had been encouraging such a move for a long time. Indeed,

the upcoming election campaign would occupy most of the U.S. Embassy’s

time until the end of the year.

Just as the  election was a milestone in modern Korean history, it

was also a milestone for American policy on the peninsula. In Washington

there had been an ongoing debate for several years concerning the best way

to convince the Chun government that open elections were in its best inter-

est. During the Carter years, direct and continuous confrontation with the