• ROK military authorities had not produced any good result. The Reagan
policy was to continue to encourage liberalization of the Korean political
system, though in a less confrontational and demanding manner. During
the time that Ambassador Richard L. Walker was in Seoul (–), he
had met privately with Roh Tae Woo and his associates on a regular basis.
Walker was a very low-key, yet skillful, diplomat, and I think his softer ap-
proach to the issue of free elections made some impression on Roh.^5 Both
Lilley, who replaced Walker in the fall of , and Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston Sigur in Washington were
determined to avoid a repeat of the course of events of . They maneu-
vered skillfully to achieve this goal.
My own opinion is that Chun’s and Roh’s decision to support a free and
open election was caused by several practical factors, not the least of which
was that Roh thought he stood a better than - chance of winning. Kim
Jong Pil, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Young Sam were sure to divide the opposi-
tion vote, and this would give Roh an excellent opportunity to win a plural-
ity, which was all that was needed to win the election under the proposed
reforms. Also, he faced the prospect of continuous demonstrations, even
violent civil conflict, if he refused, for unrest was far more widespread than
it had been in . I suspect that American views may have had some part
in the military government’s decision, but they were certainly not the ma-
jor factor. Regardless, our diplomatic overtures on this subject were certainly
handled more adeptly by the Reagan administration than by Carter. They
included successful efforts to convey the U.S. belief that the armed forces
should not intervene in the internal political or civil affairs of the country.
In September, , Ambassador Lilley was instructed by Washington
that the successful conduct of the presidential election represented the
American government’s number-one policy objective in Korea in the weeks
ahead. Although it was not directly stated, it was understood that if the
military stayed out of the election and honored its results, our policy would
be considered successful. From that time on, Lilley was totally focused on
this subject. He met with Chuck Kartman, John Stein, and me at least weekly
to discuss election issues. The election was also the major topic during the
weekly country-team meeting, which included all the principal embassy
staff. Lilley was especially interested in what the Korean military was think-
ing and whether or not they would stay out of the political arena this time
and allow the voting to proceed.
My view of the Korean military in the fall of was that it had changed
considerably since –. I had always viewed Roh Tae Woo as more