• result in a swift and decisive counteraction. I believe these detailed prepa-
rations and actions helped produce second thoughts in North Korea about
disrupting the games.
During and following the Olympics, we had a steady stream of VIPs who
visited South Korea. I was able to meet and talk with several of these, in-
cluding former Presidents Nixon and Ford, Henry Kissinger, and several
others. Seoul in those days was almost like Hollywood, there were so many
celebrities. My wife worked for NBC VIP relations during the Olympics and
was able to meet and guide the movie star Arnold Schwarzenegger around
the capital. Even though she also was able to meet Nixon, Ford, Kissinger,
and numerous other VIPs, she was impressed the most by Schwarz-
enegger—she still talks about “her friend Arnold.”
Despite our cooperation and assistance in helping make the Olympics a
success, this was also a period of rising anti-Americanism in Korea. The
causes of this sentiment were complex then and remain so today. Koreans
were understandably proud that they hosted such a successful Olympics and
were angered at some of the unflattering coverage by the American media,
especially NBC’s treatment of an incident involving a Korean boxer. The
Olympics also enhanced their nationalism, and several unfortunate events
involving Americans during the Olympics only added fuel to the fire.^10
Following the games, Ambassador Lilley’s attention focused directly on
the U.S. presidential election. As a close associate of George Bush, he was
far from neutral in the contest. When Bush was elected in November, ,
Lilley was delighted and began plans to leave his post in Seoul. Most of us
thought he would be named ambassador to China, but I think Lilley himself
would have preferred a job in Washington, possibly as national security ad-
visor. Bush eventually assigned him to China. Late in the administration,
Lilley served in a senior Pentagon post.
Intelligence FailuresAlthough our information about North Korea was generally good during
this period, there were at least two incidents where it was inaccurate. The
first was the erroneously reported death of Kim Il Sung in November, .^11
This mistake was an example of what happens when rumors become
public before the intelligence apparatus has an opportunity to fully evaluate
them. The rumor that Kim Il Sung had died apparently began with a news-
paper report from Tokyo. That in itself should have caused suspicion, for Japa-
nese press reports on matters concerning the Korean peninsula often tended