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to be alarmist and unsubstantiated. This particular story took on a life of
its own. Shortly following the Japanese report, a front-line ROK unit reported
that the North Koreans were playing somber music, and there was an
unconfirmed report that the flag of North Korea at its truce village near
Panmunjom was flying at half-mast. Neither of these reports proved to be
true, but they were immediately reported by the media. The Korean intelli-
gence community tended to believe the rumors, while the U.S. side was
unable to provide any confirmation. We had received the same reports re-
garding the flag and music but could not determine their accuracy. Unfor-
tunately, either through a misunderstanding, translation error, or perhaps
because of intense pressure from the Blue House to either confirm or deny
this story, the Korean Ministry of Defense reported publicly that Kim Il Sung
was indeed dead. It was quite an embarrassment when he showed up the
following day to greet a Mongolian delegation at the Pyongyang airport,
looking healthy and fit.
Another intelligence fiasco was Kumgang Dam. South Koreans, based on
engineering studies and some defector reports, strongly believed that the
North Korean Kumgang Dam project was designed for military rather than
civilian purposes. If completed, they believed the structure could release
millions of tons of water that would flood areas of the South. In response,
they began construction on a counterdam called the “Peace Dam.”^12 The
American side was under a lot of pressure from the Korean side to confirm
the threatening nature of the Kumgang Dam. Despite many weeks of study,
we were never able to verify the extent of danger actually posed. Because
our Korean allies were so concerned and had spent a great deal of effort and
money on the “Peace Dam,” we eventually supported their claims, although
there really was not much evidence to confirm them.
If there is a common point to these two incidents, it is that, to be effective
and reliable, intelligence must always make its judgments completely inde-
pendent of political pressure. Otherwise there will invariably be mistakes
or inaccurate information released. In my experience, it is better to admit
you are not certain about a particular situation than it is to pretend you have
all the answers. This is especially true in the international-intelligence busi-
ness, where wrong judgments can have very serious consequences.Visiting CongressmenOne of the sources of political pressure on American officials in the field has
always been visiting congressmen from Washington, who in my experience