Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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importance of the morale and welfare issues Jody had raised. The Ameri-

can secretary of defense had now weighed in on the side of our troops. So

much for carefully laid staff work and diplomacy.

The U.S. Army finally gave up the golf course in November, , but then

only after the Korean government built a replacement course in the

Songnam area not far from Seoul.

The F-16–F/A-18 and P3C-Atlantique Competitions

As indicated previously, part of my job as defense attaché was to assist U.S.

business interests, especially defense-related contractors, in their efforts to

compete successfully for contracts in South Korea. This part of my job be-

came even more important in the latter part of  and early , when

American companies were in some fierce competition over two big contracts.

The first of these contracts involved the ROK Air Force’s new-generation

fighter aircraft, which we referred to as the KFP (Korea Fighter Program).

The two competitors were major American companies, with General Dy-

namics (later Lockheed) encouraging the Korean government to buy the

F- and McDonnell Douglas marketing the F/A-. The F- was already

in the ROK Air Force inventory and had some advantages in terms of logis-

tical support and the fact that the ROKAF already had trained pilots and

crews. Also, the F- was less expensive. As a result, General Dynamics was

originally very confident that it would win the contract. McDonnell Dou-

glas was considered a big underdog, but it had a good marketing team and

was able to win support for its airplane from the ROKAF on the basis of

superior performance, a higher level of technology transfer, and the fact that

the F/A- had two engines, which most pilots preferred for safety reasons.

Because there were two American companies competing, embassy per-

sonnel were under strict instructions to be completely impartial. Behind the

scenes, however, there was a lot of maneuvering going on by both compa-

nies to make it appear that they had the support of the U.S. government.

This was compounded by the fact that the U.S. Air Force strongly desired

the F- to be chosen, while the U.S. Navy, which operates the F/A-,

wanted Korea to choose that plane. Each of the corporations hired big-name

lobbyists, retired generals, and sent briefing teams to Korea to try to con-

vince the government to buy their airplane. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy

were also working aggressively in private to encourage the selection of their

favorite fighter. It was a tough competition, but MND eventually sided with

the ROKAF and chose the F/A-.