Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

(Dana P.) #1
    • 

Kim then launched into a lengthy review of North Korea’s policy on vari-
ous issues, including reunification, relations with the United States, and
defense matters.^2 He spoke of the need for the reunification of the Korean
peninsula, though only as a confederation on North Korea’s terms. He said
that detente and collaboration should replace confrontation but then
quickly added that this could occur only if the United States changed its
policies. North Korea, he emphasized, must be treated as an equal, not as a
nation that could be dictated to.
Surprisingly, Kim acknowledged that military expenditures were a burden
on the DPRK economy. He said that there had been a recent ,-man
reduction in the North’s armed forces and that another , were dedi-
cated almost entirely to civil-works projects. As expected, he attacked the
annual U.S.-ROK military exercise Team Spirit, which he blamed for disrupt-
ing the North-South dialogue. For example, Kim said, cancellation of the 
exercise had been requested by the DPRK as a condition for North Korean
participation in the previously scheduled prime ministers’ session. The ROK
had been willing to cancel, he alleged inaccurately, but the United States re-
fused and thus was responsible for the suspension of these high-level talks.
Stilwell reminded Kim that he personally had initiated the Team Spirit
exercises in  and therefore was very familiar with the scope and purpose
of the exercise. The sole purpose of Team Spirit was to assure the U.S. capa-
bility to carry out its commitment to help defend against any further aggres-
sion from the North, and it was in no way provocative. Kim replied that the
DPRK had not objected to Team Spirit when it was of smaller scale, but now
it had become a “reinforcement” exercise involving , U.S. troops.
I was surprised that the senior military officer in North Korea was so
unfamiliar with the actual facts concerning Team Spirit. For example, the
 exercise involved only about , U.S. troops, far less than the
, Kim stated. Also, it was impossible for the United States to continue
this exercise in  or any other year without the cooperation and sup-
port of the ROK, which provided the bulk of the forces and internal sup-
port.^3 This was the first of several indications we received that the North
Korean leadership was not particularly well informed about some impor-
tant matters.


Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam

If the meeting with Kim Kwan Jin had been less than satisfactory, our next
meeting, which was with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam, was even more

Free download pdf