• tems would become complementary. He summarily dismissed all alterna-
tive South Korean proposals, instead calling for the concept of one nation
and one state but two systems and two governments. The confederation
would have one national assembly and an executive committee in which
North and South Koreans would be represented on equal footing with rep-
resentatives of overseas Koreans. The chairmanship would rotate annually
between North and South. Kim suggested the replacement of the armistice
with an agreement between the two Koreas that would convert the DMZ
into a temporary boundary, pending reunification.
The foreign minister said North Korea was closely monitoring American
policy through the news media and occasional visits to the United States.
He criticized the “heavy-handed” policy of the United States, which attached
preconditions to an improvement in relations. He also charged that Japan
wanted to improve relations with the DPRK but that the United States and
South Korea were blocking this. Kim further stated, without much evidence,
that Japan was demanding international inspection of North Korea’s
nuclear facilities as a precondition to improved relations because it wished
once more to become a military power, specifically a nuclear power, and
replace the United States as the dominant force in Asia. After almost one
and a half hours of nonstop lecturing, Kim finally stopped talking.
Responding in part to Kim’s extended admonition, General Stilwell noted
that our delegation had come to Pyongyang with the understanding that
North Korea wanted an open and frank dialogue. We assumed, he said, that
North Korea’s deteriorating economy, the loss of its credit rating, and its
heavy defense burden might be influencing the country to adopt more flex-
ible policies. Based on our meetings thus far, however, Stilwell said we had
yet to detect any change. Like North Korea, the United States had condi-
tions for an improvement in bilateral relations, including renunciation of
terrorism, adherence to the nuclear safeguards agreement, and a more re-
sponsible policy regarding the export of weapons (for example, intermedi-
ate-range missiles to the Middle East). As for U.S. policy toward the Korean
peninsula, Stilwell said that our steady policy did not reflect a lack of cour-
age but caution and prudence because the well being of seventy million
Koreans was at stake.
General Stilwell then made a surprise offer to the North Koreans. He
offered to provide up to one hundred scholarships for North Korean stu-
dents to study at colleges and universities in the United States. The DPRK
government would choose the students, he said, and the subjects they
would study. Kim was initially taken aback by this proposal, which was