Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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totally unexpected, and did not respond. Toward the end of the meeting,

Stilwell repeated the offer, and by now Kim had recovered sufficiently to re-

ject it as being “inappropriate.”

The Conference on Korea Security

If the meetings with the senior DPRK leadership had been less than satis-

factory, any hopes that the actual conference would produce better results

were quickly dashed. Despite an earlier agreement on a specific agenda, the

North Koreans began by putting forward a printed version of their own

agenda and then proceeded to follow it for the duration of the two-day con-

ference. The result was that we were sometimes talking about different is-

sues. For example, the North Koreans insisted on discussing their own

formula for reunification, but we believed that this was basically an issue

between the ROK and DPRK and inappropriate for us to discuss. Anyhow,

the conference centered around three topics: arms control on the Korean

peninsula, U.S.–North Korean relations, and nuclear energy and weapons.

Arms Control

General Stilwell opened the formal conference on the subject of arms con-

trol.^4 He emphasized that the principal cause of tension on the Korean pen-

insula was the large concentration of military forces on both sides of the

Demilitarized Zone. North Korean forces, in particular, were larger than

those of the ROK, were structured for an offensive capability, and were de-

ployed to attack with little or no warning.

In an effort to find a successful precedent for arms control, Stilwell noted

that negotiations for the reduction of arms in Europe had been a long and

difficult process. During the first ten years of the talks, little was achieved

because the negotiators were unable to agree on a common set of facts. Only

after the Soviet Union agreed to provide accurate data on the size and capa-

bilities of its armed forces was progress achieved. Stilwell said the same holds

true for future negotiations on the peninsula, noting that North Korea re-

fused to provide information on the strength and equipment of its armed

forces and denied the accuracy of information published by a variety of

reputable sources, which estimated the North Korean Army at over one

million men. He asked that the DPRK be more open during the conference

and said he was willing to provide them with his own estimates of North

Korean forces. Without agreement on the military strength of either na-