• tion, there could be no real confidence that the two sides were negotiating
in good faith.
From the beginning of their answering statement, it was clear that the
North Korean side was more interested in presenting its own views than in
exploring any new solutions. Speaking for the DPRK, Maj. Gen. Kim Yong
Chul stated the often-repeated position that a declaration of nonaggression
between North and South Korea was a prerequisite for arms reduction. North
Korea first proposed such a declaration in , he said, that called for mu-
tual recognition and respect, the peaceful resolution of disputes, an end to
the propaganda war, effective military confidence building, and a phased re-
duction of arms. A nonaggression declaration would begin to dispel mistrust
and build confidence, Kim argued. Once such a declaration was adopted, ex-
change of information on military exercises and military strength would be
possible. He called further for a separate U.S.–North Korean peace treaty.
General Kim dismissed the comparison to negotiations on arms reduc-
tion in Europe, arguing that such comparisons were not relevant to the
Korean situation. The best formula for building mutual confidence, he said,
was a declaration of nonaggression. I then asked Kim whether the free
movement of ideas and people would not contribute to the reduction of ten-
sion. He replied somewhat reluctantly that it would be helpful, but that could
only occur once the military confrontation had been reduced.
Following some more give and take, our group was asked to endorse the
DPRK proposal for a North-South declaration of nonaggression. Both Gen-
erals Davis and Bazley, who had little experience concerning Communist
negotiating and propaganda techniques, indicated that they would consider
endorsing such a plan. General Stilwell quickly intervened, however, and
would have nothing of it. He pointed out that he was not familiar with the
specific language or the negotiating history that surrounded the proposal,
and indeed, nonaggression with respect to all other states would be an ex-
plicit commitment assumed when the two states enter the United Nations.
What was important, he said, was the mutual undertakings and actions that
gave real meaning to such a declaration of nonaggression. After the ex-
change, I was glad that we had Stilwell’s leadership and experience; with-
out it, I think some of our members might have been misled into doing
something that they would have later regretted.
Once the North Koreans realized that we were not going to openly endorse
their plan, the mood turned even worse. They had apparently intended to ar-
range a news conference to announce our acceptance of the nonaggression
proposal, and this had to be canceled. At one time it was strongly suggested