• sue as a precondition for improved relations with the United States. This,
he said, complicated matters because North Korea wanted improved rela-
tions without preconditions. Because it recognized the MIAs as an obstacle,
however, it was willing to resolve the issue.^5
Moving on to other issues, Mr. Li Hyong Chul of the DPRK group said
that the United States and North Korea needed to increase their contacts
and dialogue in order to achieve an improvement in their relations. He ac-
cused U.S. policy of being outdated. Given cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and South Korea, and the ties between the United
States and China, an end to America’s “cold war” treatment of North Ko-
rea was now appropriate.
Li declared there was no reason for the United States and North Korea to
remain enemies and called on the United States to enter into direct negotia-
tions with the DPRK without preconditions so the armistice agreement
could be replaced by a peace treaty. Such a resolution would enable the
United States to withdraw its troops from South Korea under a timetable to
be negotiated in the future.
By this time it was apparent that the North Korean objective continued
to be to separate the United States from the ROK by establishing these bi-
lateral mechanisms such as joint committees, direct negotiations, and a
separate peace treaty, among others. Since this was counter to existing U.S.
government policy, we were in no position to accept any of these proposals.
Thus, the issue of improved U.S.–North Korean relations also concluded
without any agreements.
Nuclear Energy and WeaponsThe final and most important topic was now at hand. I had had some prior
contact with the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program. In the summer
of , as rumors of North Korean nuclear work spread, I was among the
members of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul who made a request to Washington
for a briefing. Soon personnel arrived from CIA headquarters, including in-
telligence and technical experts in the nuclear field. The information they
presented showed very strong evidence that North Korea was indeed devel-
oping a nuclear-weapons capability. After a question-and-answer session,
the senior American present made a strong request that this information
not be leaked from the room, but, of course, newspapers circulated reports
of the briefing within a day or two.^6