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The embassy naturally wanted to pursue a diplomatic approach to the
issue, working through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
an effort to cause the DPRK to give up its plan. A direct approach was also
considered, but it was decided against this course of action for political rea-
sons. As it turned out, this decision merely postponed the meetings that
began with the North Koreans in New York in .^7
But in no one wanted to consider military action, though most of
us believed it was a viable option, at least from a military standpoint. North
Korea’s nuclear facilities were not yet fully developed or protected and were
vulnerable to air or missile attack. Our analysis was that the DPRK would
not voluntarily give up this program without getting something substan-
tial in return, and the lengthy diplomatic process would probably not be
successful until the North was very close to, or at the actual stage of, pro-
ducing a nuclear weapon. (This has proven to be an accurate estimate.) I
do not believe that a quick preemptive strike of the type that Israel made on
Iraq’s nuclear facilities a few years earlier was ever seriously considered, even
though in there was a fairly high chance of success.
Dr. Van Cleave, an expert on nuclear weapons, opened the discussion on
this issue. He began by emphasizing the importance that the United States,
and indeed most of the rest of the world, placed on the issue of nuclear
nonproliferation. The evidence was clear, he said, that North Korea was
trying to avoid its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty by developing a capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Van Cleave next invited the North Koreans to clarify their policy and their
intentions. He noted the effort and resources that North Korea was pouring into
the construction and improvement of its Yongbyon nuclear complex, which
already had two or three reactors and a probable plutonium reprocessing plant.
Displaying a satellite picture of the complex, Van Cleave said he could identify a
reactor capable of producing plutonium, a probable plutonium separation plant,
and a possible enrichment plant. As he pointed out each of these facilities on
the satellite photo, the North Koreans appeared startled, surprised, and nervous.
There was no indication that the DPRK was using this complex for the
production of electricity or energy; instead, it appeared to be a weapons
facility, Van Cleave declared. He asked the purpose of separating the fuel from
the plutonium and reprocessing it if the purpose was peaceful and not for
weapons production, noting that the answers to his questions bore impor-
tantly on the improvement of U.S.–North Korean relations. He noted too
that North Korea was suspected of having chemical-weapons production
facilities as well. All in all, North Korea seemed disturbingly interested in