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been generally harmonious. Kim Dae Jung has received high marks by most
international observers, and in he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.Lessons LearnedMy experience over the years has resulted in several “lessons learned.” One
of these is the importance of training legitimate area experts. This is rela-
tively easy when dealing with European countries, where the languages and
culture are not that different from our own. In Asia, however, the develop-
ment of true area experts who are knowledgeable of the history, politics,
economic patterns, culture, and language of a specific country is a lengthy
and expensive undertaking. When I reached the rank of colonel, there were
perhaps two or three other officers of that rank in the army who were le-
gitimate Korea experts. Today, with a smaller service, there are probably only
one or two. Neither the navy nor the air force has any programs to develop
area specialists. Nor is the situation much better in the State Department,
which has only one or two senior career diplomats capable of conducting
an intelligent conversation in Korean. Americans are notorious for being
poor linguists and insensitive to the cultures of other countries, but surely
we can invest the time and effort necessary to develop experienced and com-
petent specialists.
Regarding the conduct of our foreign policy, I have learned several gen-
eral principles. First, we need to be aware of our limitations when imposing
traditional American values and institutions on other countries. This is
particularly true in Asia, where Confucian values and different political and
economic factors exist. In most Asian countries, particularly the Koreas,
internal factors are far more important in determining behavior or the
manner in which a particular decision may be made. By understanding
those influences better, diplomats and senior military officers will be more
successful in working with their counterparts toward mutually successful
outcomes. In the process, they also will be more successful in furthering U.S.
goals and interests.
Second, diplomacy is more successful when conducted in a low-key and
nonconfrontational manner. The many efforts during the Carter years to
effect South Korean behavior were unsuccessful in part because we were too
direct and forceful, particularly in the human rights area. Carter’s uncoor-
dinated and poorly timed troop-withdrawal policy was ultimately a failure,
sabotaged in some cases by his own subordinates. The Reagan years, which
focused on low-key, private representations, were ultimately successful. The