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Koreans hold the United States at least partially reasonable for those un-
pleasant events in modern Korean history.Thoughts on North KoreaIn the years following my retirement from the army, I have also formed some
opinions concerning the North Koreans based on my dealing with them
both in a semiofficial context during the conference in Pyongyang and in
subsequent dealings over the past few years.
First, they are more fragmented internally than is commonly thought.
This began following the death of Kim Il Sung and is manifested in conflict-
ing attitudes among some of their leadership, examples including the mili-
tary versus certain “moderates” in the foreign ministry, and the commercial
policymakers in Pyongyang versus production managers in the field, who
are charged with carrying out policy decisions with virtually no resources
allocated for the task. The breach between Pyongyang and the countryside
has grown with the prolonged economic and food crises, and at some point
the authority of the central government may be eroded.
Second, they are very compartmentalized, even at the higher levels of
government. Thus, a senior officer charged with North Korean political
policy may be quite expert in that field but have virtually no expertise in
commercial, economic, or military matters that heavily affect his primary
area of responsibility. Contrast this with a modern American military officer
or foreign service officer, whose depth of knowledge and appreciation of
a multidisciplined approach to problem solving is far broader. If our own
officials are sometimes criticized for being “a mile wide and an inch deep,”
I would submit that my experience with the North Koreans tends to expose
them as “an inch wide and an inch deep.”
Third, at least some North Koreans are genuinely sincere in their de-
sire for a better relationship with the United States. They are cognizant of
the benefits that a better political relationship and access to technology
and commercial contacts will ultimately bring to their country. Regretta-
bly they have painted themselves into a corner internally, from which there
is probably no escape. A true liberalization of the economy and the social
system to the extent that it would allow access to the benefits of a market
economy and the western technological revolution is virtually impossible.
To do so would be for the North Korean leadership to admit to their popu-
lation that, for the past five and a half decades, the people have been vic-
tims of the “big lie.”