. Regardless of the true location of the helicopter, the conventional wisdom in Wash-
ington was that it had no business being in the JSA, especially since troops had
been withdrawn and the mission accomplished. This incident is mentioned briefly
in ibid., p. .Chapter 3. Rise of the Troop-Withdrawal Issue. For an excellent survey of Carter’s efforts to redirect U.S. foreign policy, see Gaddis
Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New
York: Hill and Wang, ).
. President Ford’s election committee kept a record of Carter’s statements along these
lines. They can be found in Research Office, Carter Quotes File, Box H, President
Ford Committee Records, –, GRFL.
Carter’s ideas were not totally out of step with the thinking of some leading U.S.
officials going back as far as the Eisenhower administration. In a National Security
Council meeting on April , , for example, President Eisenhower, who also
doubted the feasibility of maintaining substantial numbers of U.S. troops in Eu-
rope over the long term, showed sympathy toward keeping merely “token forces”
in Korea. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, –,
vol. , pt. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, ), p. . Four-
teen years later Pres. Richard Nixon expressed to his national security advisor an
interest in reducing U.S. forces in Korea to a sufficient “air and sea presence...
necessary for the kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned” if North Korea
attacked the South. Nixon to Henry Kissinger, Nov. , , Box , Subject Files,
National Security Council Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, U.S. National
Archives II, College Park, Md.
. This story is told from the perspective of USFK in Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, pp.
–. For a well-informed secondary account, see Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, pp.
–. For a briefer account sympathetic to Carter, see Selig Harrison, Korean
Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, ), pp. –.
. In a proposed text for a joint communiqué at the end of the Ford-Park meeting, the
South Koreans included the following statement: “The two presidents noted that
the increasing military capabilities of North Korea continue to pose a serious threat
to the security of the Republic of Korea.” See Seoul Embassy to the Secretary of
State, Nov. , , Box , Press Secretary’s Files, GRFL. This statement was not in
the actual joint communiqué issued on November , . See Department of State
Bulletin (Dec. , ): –. The author does not believe there was a direct
connection between the Ford-Park meeting and the subsequent U.S. Army study.
. Back in Seoul, Vessey told others the same thing. See Singlaub, Hazardous Duty,
p. .
. Ibid., p. .
. On May he wired the JCS that the “option calling for total withdrawal of ground
forces by Dec carries significant risk to peace on [the] Korean peninsula....
ROK forces would not be able to achieve and maintain offsetting capabilities in this
time frame.” Of the options with which he was presented, the one projecting com-
plete withdrawal by July, , would “minimize risks,” but even this one would
“require maximum flexibility and latitude [for the field commander] to adjust [the]
withdrawal schedule to assure ability to accomplish missions and maintain ROK
confidence to defend themselves.” Six days later he told the JCS that “withdrawal • ‒