of U.S. ground forces from Korea will have a profound effect upon both allies and
adversaries throughout the Pacific. This pullback will be perceived as evidence of
slackening U.S. resolve to play a decisive role in Asia. No combination of actions
will offset the psychological, political, economic, and military impact of our with-
drawal.” CINCPAC to JCS, May , , , Box , Country File, National Secu-
rity Affairs, BM.
. For Singlaub’s account, see Hazardous Duty, pp. –. For Saar’s article, see WP,
May , , p. A.
. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, pp. –.
. For the record of the open portion of the hearings, see U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Review of the Policy
Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea before the Investigations
Subcommittee, th Cong., st, d sess., May , (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, ).
. The New York Times, which had previously supported Carter’s plan for withdrawal
and his disciplining of Singlaub, gave wide coverage of the issue as it emerged in
Congress. See NYT, May , , sec. , pp. , ; May , , p. ; June , ,
pp. , ; June , , p. ; May , , p. ; May , , p. ; May , ,
sec. , p. . In July the paper did a public-opinion survey with CBS News and found
that percent of those interviewed were in favor of retaining some U.S. troops in
the ROK on an indefinite basis. NYT, July , , p. . Stilwell’s views received
major attention in Newsweek, June , , p. .
. Brown and Habib to the President, May , , Box , Country File, National
Security Affairs, BM. For a mixed but basically pessimistic assessment of the situa-
tion in Congress after Habib testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on June , see Zbigniew Brzezinski [national security adviser] to the President,
June , , ibid. By the end of the month, Mike Armacost, an aide to Brzezinski
on the National Security Council, was privately expressing outrage that the De-
fense Department had released to the House Armed Services Committee a series of
top-secret messages from General Vessey to the JCS challenging the withdrawal
policy. See Armacost to Brzezinski, June , , ibid. On July Brzezinski re-
ported to the president that “the reaction of Congressional leaders to Harold
Brown’s Korean briefing this morning was very chilly.... Sentiment in favor of
troop withdrawal is at best lukewarm and passive. This is bad enough, but worse
yet are the indications that it will be very difficult to secure the needed military
assistance to upgrade ROK defenses as we withdraw.” See ibid.
. Part of this story is told in Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, p. . It was also related to
the author by one of General Vessey’s senior staff officers shortly after he returned
from Washington.
. For more on Holbrooke and the withdrawal issue, see Gleysteen, Massive Entangle-
ment, pp. –. Although later the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Gleysteen
was initially Holbrooke’s deputy in the State Department. For evidence of dissent
within the administration, see the minutes of the Policy Review Committee meet-
ing, Apr. , , Box , Subject File, DHM. Holbrooke, Abramowitz, and
Armacost were all in attendance at this meeting.
. The author was not personally involved with the activities of Holbrooke. This ac-
count is developed from several other published versions. For more information
and background, see Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –; Oberdorfer, Two
Koreas, pp. –; and Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, pp. –.
. Habib had been seeking a review of U.S. force levels in Korea since at least ,
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