when he was the American ambassador in Seoul. See “Secretary’s Staff Meeting,
January , ,” Jan. , , Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, National Security Archives, Washington, D.C. Back in
Washington in as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Habib pushed for U.S. troop withdrawals. See “Secretary’s Staff Meeting, June ,
,” ibid.
. For an expression of concern on this issue by one who formally supported Carter’s
policy, see Brzezinski to the President, Apr. , , Box , Subject File, DHM.
. Unlike PRM-, PRM- was widely staffed within the State Department, Depart-
ment of Defense, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council,
in many cases down to the working level. Its existence was well known within the
Washington bureaucracy and Seoul embassy staff, and it was a much more profes-
sional product than PRM-.Chapter 4. To Korea Again. For the background, see Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –; and various
materials, Boxes , , Country File, National Security Affairs, BM. By April, ,
Brzezinski was advising Carter to ease away from his stance on troop withdrawal.
See Brzezinski to the President [National Security Council Weekly Report ], Apr.
, , Box , Subject File, DHM.
. See Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, p. . Carter took extensive notes on his meet-
ing with Park Chung Hee. Nicholas Platt, a National Security Council staffer, did as
well, and his account was developed into a “Memorandum of Conversation” dated
July . Both men’s writings are found in Box , President’s Personal Foreign Affairs
File, Plains File, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Ga.
. Several varying accounts of this event circulated after the summit. For Gleysteen’s,
see Massive Entanglement, pp. –. See also Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, p. .
. On July Brzezinski wrote to Carter that “the time has come for a decision on U.S.
ground force withdrawals from the ROK.” He proceeded to weigh the options and
suggest that the president either () put all further consideration of withdrawals in
abeyance until or () withdraw , men by the end of , with consider-
ation of further withdrawals held off until . Carter chose the former option,
which was announced on July . See Box , Subject File, DHM. See also Gleysteen,
Massive Entanglement, pp. –.
. For elaboration on the matter by the ambassador, see Gleysteen, Massive Entangle-
ment, pp. –.Chapter 5. The Park Assassination and Its Aftermath. U.S. Embassy, Seoul, U.S. Information Service Press Office, “U.S. Government State-
ment on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May ,” June , , p.
. This document is published in full in Wickham, Korea on the Brink, pp. –.
. For Ambassador Gleysteen’s treatment of this issue, see Massive Entanglement, pp.
–, –.
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. For Ambassador Gleysteen’s account, see Massive Entanglement, p. . For the text
of the “scope paper” prepared for Vance on his Korea visit, see Secretary of State to
American Embassy, Seoul, Nov. , , “State Department Documents Declassi-
fied on June , ,” copy in editor’s possession. • ‒