Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

(Dana P.) #1

. For a description of Chung by Gen. John A. Wickham, the commander of U.S. Forces
Korea at the time, see Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. Detailed discussions of these events are found in chapters  and .
. For General Wickham’s account on this matter, see Korea on the Brink, pp. , –
. Ambassador Gleysteen does not make it clear whether or not he was aware of
the rumors prior to /. See Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, p. .
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. Ibid., p. .


Chapter 6. The 12/12 Incident

. General Choi was a Class  KMA classmate and confidant of Chun Doo Hwan. He
was not involved directly in the / events but substantially profited from them.
Within two days he was promoted from deputy intelligence chief of the army (as-
sistant to G-) to the J- position, the senior military intelligence officer in Korea.
. For Wickham’s account of events in the Bunker, see Korea on the Brink, pp. –;
for Gleysteen’s perspective, see Massive Entanglement, pp. –.
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .


Chapter 7. Aftermath of 12/12

. Itaewon, a section of Seoul located adjacent to the Yongsan army base, remains a
popular entertainment and shopping area for foreigners.
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –.
. Gleysteen says that the meeting was “at my request.” Ibid., p. .
. The ambassador was held in high regard in Washington. Early in the year, Na-
tional Security Council staffer Nicholas Platt wrote to Brzezinski that, “since as-
suming his post in Seoul this summer [Gleysteen] has taken hold as one of our
strongest Ambassadors in Asia.” In particular Platt commended Gleysteen on his
handling of visiting members of Congress. See Platt to Brzezinski, Jan. , ,
Box , Country File, National Security Affairs, BM. Finessing American legisla-
tors, of course, was an entirely different matter than confronting an aspiring mili-
tary dictator on his own turf.
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –. For a highly sanitized account of the
meeting, see Gleysteen to the Secretary of State, Dec. , , Box , Country
File, National Security Affairs, BM.
. See Mark L. Clifford, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South
Korea (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, ), chaps. , .
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. On the  case, see William Stueck, “Democratization in Korea: The United States
Role,  and ,” International Journal of Korean Studies , no.  (fall/winter,
): –.
. Wickham was approached by a more senior officer. See Wickham, Korea on the Brink,
pp. –. Apparently Gleysteen was not approached directly, but he was informed
of the plot(s). See Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –.


Chapter 8. Prelude to Kwangju

. See NYT, Feb. , , p. ; Mar. , , p. ; Mar. , , p. .
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –. Gleysteen’s account is consistent with


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