his reporting at the time as reflected in “State Department Documents Declassified
on June , ,” copies in editor’s possession.
. For Wickham’s account of this meeting, see Korea on the Brink, pp. –.
. Wickham implies that the meeting came about as a result of hints from an inter-
mediary, Gen. Mun Hyong Tae, now retired from the army and a member of the
National Assembly Defense Committee. See Wickham, Korea on the Brink, pp. ,
–.
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –.
. See ibid., pp. –.
. Gleysteen does not acknowledge the dissent of the U.S. military. See ibid.
. Ibid., pp. –.
. See ibid., pp. –; and Gleysteen to the Secretary of State, May , , in “State
Department Documents Declassified on June , ,” copy in editor’s possession.
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, pp. –.
. InSam Cha is a unique Korean tea derived from ginseng roots.
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, pp. –, .
. Ibid., p. .
. Ibid.; Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, p. .Chapter 9. Kwangju and Its Aftermath. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. For a brief account of events covered in this chapter, see Oberdorfer, Two Koreas,
pp. –; and Nam Koon Woo, South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Con-
sensus and Stability (New York: University Press of America, ), pp. –. For
a sharp critique of U.S. policy, see Tim Shorrock, “U.S. Knew of South Korean Crack-
down: Ex-Leaders Go on Trial in Seoul,” Journal of Commerce, Feb. , , p. ;
and Tim Shorrock, “The U.S. Role in Korea in and ,” Korea Web Weekly,
Oct. <http://www.kimsoft.com/korea//kwangju.htm>. For a more moder-
ate critique, see James Fowler, “The United States and South Korean Democratiza-
tion,” Political Science Quarterly , no. (Oct., ): –. For a less critical
analysis, see Stueck, “Democratization in Korea,” pp. –.
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, pp. –.
. Ibid., –; Wickham, Korea on the Brink, ; Gleysteen to Secretary of State,
May , , Box , Country File, National Security Affairs, BM.
. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, p. .
. Ibid., pp. –.
. Some accounts of this period tend to paint Brewster as a supporter of Chun. In the
author’s experience this was not the case. Brewster was always evenhanded in his
approach. For a contrary view, see Wickham, Korea on the Brink, pp. , , , .
. Ibid., p. .
. Ibid., p. . For various eyewitness accounts of events in Kwangju, see Henry Scott-
Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, eds., The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of
Korea’s Tiananmen (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, ).
. Wickham, Korea on the Brink, p. .
. See Gleysteen, Report to the Secretary of State, May , , Box , Country
File, National Security Affairs, BM.
. Ambassador Gleysteen makes the following statement on this general issue: “We
had a strong, Korean-speaking officer in the Political Section, Spence Richardson,
who visited Kwangju after the crisis and prepared a solid report. I now fault myself • ‒