. For a useful analysis of the North-South military balance from to , see
Jack E. Thomas, “The Military Situation and Capabilities of North Korea,” in Ko-
rean Challenges and American Policy, ed., Ilpyong J. Kim (New York: Paragon House,
), pp. –. For a similar comparative analysis of the economic realm, see
Byoung-lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transac-
tion, ), pp. –.
. For background on North Korea’s atomic bomb project, see Michael J. Mazarr, North
Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s, ).
. The first Korean officer in this position was Maj. Gen. Hwang Won Taek.
. In the North linked Team Spirit’s cancellation to progress on the nuclear in-
spection issue. Although there was no formal agreement on the matter, the exer-
cise was not held in future years. (See chap. , note .)Chapter 11. My Fourth Tour in Korea Begins. The activities of / played some role in the Department of Defense’s desire to
upgrade the Defense Attaché Office. In addition, by Korea was more impor-
tant than had been the case in .
. In Kartman was assigned as the deputy ambassador in South Korea and two
years later was appointed special envoy for the Korean peace talks with the rank of
ambassador.
. The United States did not establish formal diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China until . Bush was the head of the American mission in Beijing,
in effect, the ambassador.
. For a solid narrative of events, see Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, pp. –. For more
analytical accounts comparing the events of to those of , see Stueck,
“Democratization in Korea”; and Fowler, “United States and South Korean Democ-
ratization.” For an account placed in the context of the political history of the ROK,
see John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic
Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, ), pp. –.
. Walker’s memoirs were serialized in the Korea Times during –. For the sec-
tion on Walker’s approach to the human rights and democratization issues, see
Korea Times, Aug. , , p. W.
. By this time the army was firmly in the hands of Roh Tae Woo supporters, but
there was little sentiment for direct military intervention in the election. Instead,
the military concentrated hard on appearing apolitical, although there were re-
ports that the Defense Security Command would be actively ensuring that there
would be a very heavily pro-Roh vote in the military absentee ballots.
. For reporting on this issue, including its connection to anti-Americanism in South
Korea, see WP, Dec. , , , Jan. , Feb. , ; Los Angeles Times, Dec. ,
, ; and Newsday, Jan. , .
. For a discussion of issues surrounding the Olympics and the international con-
text, see Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, pp. –, –.
. For news stories on this incident, see NYT, Dec. , , sec. , p. ; Jan. , ,
sec. , p. .
. For coverage of the boxing and other incidents, see James F. Larson and Heung-
Soo Park, Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, ), pp. –.
. For press reporting on this incident, see NYT, Nov. , , sec. , p. ; Nov. ,
, sec. , p. ; Nov. , , sec. , p. ; Nov. , , sec. , p. . • ‒