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CHAPTER 2

Into the Fray

I

n early  I was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Army, at the Pentagon in Wash-

ington, D.C. After almost four years of training as a Korea specialist,

I was now ready to become a contributor to the policy process, though

admittedly at a low level. I entered this assignment during a time of stress

in U.S.-Korean relations. The American withdrawal of a combat division

from the peninsula in , the rapid reduction of American forces in Viet-

nam, the acceptance at the beginning of  of a disadvantageous armi-

stice there, and the improvement of U.S. relations with the People’s Republic

of China created deep anxieties and uncertainties in the ROK government.

Most military officers dislike Pentagon duty, and I was at first no excep-

tion. I was placed in charge of the Northeast Asia Desk, which included

North and South Korea and Japan. Basically my responsibilities were to be

knowledgeable concerning all military, political, and other developments

that could have an effect on the region, particularly from the army perspec-

tive. Each morning I prepared briefing materials and input for the army chief

of intelligence, Maj. Gen. Harold Aaron, on any significant events in my

area. This was then incorporated into another briefing, which was given to

the army chief of staff as appropriate.

My experience in Washington gave me an appreciation for American

intelligence gathering that I could not have developed otherwise. Informa-

tion was available from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), State Department, and other sources that could

be analyzed rapidly. Often desk officers and analysts in Washington or in

other major headquarters knew more about a situation than the command-

ers and ambassadors in the field, for they had a lot more information avail-

able and more means with which to analyze it. I formed the opinion then

that you could probably find enough reporting information to reach almost

any conclusion, including one that totally contradicted another. There was

simply an enormous amount of reporting coming in—often too much. Each

morning there was a large stack of intelligence reports just in my North-