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other sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons. Occasionally
Korea and the United States have had different opinions about the develop-
ment of certain weapons systems or the transfer of technology, but these
differences have usually been worked out to the mutual satisfaction of both
sides.
In the early s, however, Park began a secret program to develop an
entirely different type of weapon, a move that was understandable given
uncertainties created by the U.S. effort to scale down its responsibilities in
Asia. Yet his action brought cooperation between the United States and
South Korea to a decisive crossroads.
Nuclear proliferation had not been of major concern to the United States
before the early s. Conventional wisdom at the time was that it would
be very difficult for most nonnuclear countries to successfully develop and
produce an atomic weapon without substantial outside assistance. The U.S.
intelligence community was confident it could detect any attempts made to
obtain such assistance. But this assessment proved to be incorrect when,
on May , , India tested a nuclear bomb. The Indian explosion caught
all Western intelligence agencies by surprise. Neither the CIA nor DIA, which
was somewhat of a fledgling organization at the time, had predicted this
event. Even the British intelligence service, which had better information
about India than the Americans, failed to correctly understand the Indians’
intentions. At any rate, this event caused a major reexamination of our
nuclear proliferation policy.
The U.S. intelligence community was ordered to make a full-scale inves-
tigation into the capabilities and possible intentions of other countries that
might be tempted to follow the same path as India. As was the customary
procedure, the CIA took the lead in this project, with assistance and sup-
port from the DIA, the military-service intelligence organizations, and oth-
ers. A few weeks later, a “Special National Intelligence Estimate” (SNIE) on
the subject of nuclear proliferation was published within the government.
For the U.S. intelligence community, publication of a SNIE is a particularly
important event. SNIEs are normally produced only at the direction of the
White House or the director of central intelligence on subjects of immedi-
ate and critical interest to the president. Accordingly, a large amount of
resources are devoted to the topic.
This SNIE was an analysis of several countries that we believed had the
capability to produce a nuclear weapon if the political order were given.
Israel was of primary interest, and it was the opinion of the SNIE that the
Israelis probably had already developed a nuclear weapon. As for South