• Korean peninsula. There was little support for threatening to withdraw our
forces or suspending the mutual-security treaty, but it was always possible
if other methods failed. Withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, however,
was considered to be a legitimate alternative, especially if Korea persisted
in developing its own nuclear capability.
After analysis of our options, authorities decided that a diplomatic ini-
tiative would be formed to present an alternative to President Park. This
would be done directly and forthrightly. The strategy would be to convince
him that he had more to gain by abandoning his nuclear weapons plan than
he had by continuing it. For example, if Park was agreeable to give up his
bomb, the United States would agree to continue to work in a positive man-
ner to assist Korea’s peaceful nuclear power development. This would not
only include the Westinghouse plants already under construction but fu-
ture plants as well. Also, the United States would continue to provide loans
and other financial incentives for the continued construction and develop-
ment of these facilities and expand technical training opportunities for
Koreans studying nuclear engineering and similar subjects in the States.
If, given these alternatives, President Park insisted on continuing with
his nuclear weapons project, stronger action would be taken. This might
include such measures as mentioned earlier up to and including strong
threats to limit the future U.S. commitment to Korea’s defense. In this re-
gard even Korea’s strong supporters in the Defense Department were pre-
pared to consider and implement such options.
The fact that Korea was working on a nuclear weapon was, of course,
quite sensitive information, limited to certain members of the intelligence
community and a close circle of top policymakers in the U.S. government.
Because of the close relationship between South Korea and the United
States, special precautions were taken to make sure the media did not be-
come aware of the situation. Our greatest fear was that there would be a
news leak before we could mount a diplomatic approach to the Blue House.
The key players in the diplomatic initiative were Ambassador to Korea
Richard Sneider and Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib. Of the two,
Habib was the more influential and played the most important role. As a
former ambassador to Korea himself, Habib knew President Park well and
had his confidence. He also had substantial credibility with the Blue House
and a reputation for a no-nonsense approach to diplomacy. Some diplomats
have a tendency to disguise their message in protocol or indirect language,
but this was not the case with Habib. The U.S. government knew it could
count on him to deliver its message in a straightforward and frank manner.