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Sometime in the spring of , the American delegation began to broach
the issue of Korea’s nuclear plans with the Blue House. The initial discus-
sions were not particularly helpful—the Koreans were reluctant to admit
the existence of such a program. Indeed, many top-level officials were not
even aware of the program because of its great secrecy. Most of these ini-
tial contacts were conducted personally by Ambassador Sneider, and the
reports of their outcome were forwarded to Washington through a special
private channel. The tone of these reports was somewhat discouraging.
Sneider was particularly unhappy that the Koreans were not forthcoming
enough to admit the extent of the nuclear program. He believed that we
would eventually have to reveal the extent of our actual knowledge from
outside intelligence sources. I recall that Ambassador Sneider at one time
said, “At some point we will simply have to tell the Koreans ‘NO.’” I inter-
preted this rather abrupt statement to mean that the United States was pre-
pared to use maximum leverage in order to stop the nuclear program.
By the summer of , President Park had been convinced to abandon
nuclear weapons development. My understanding was that Assistant Sec-
retary Habib played the critical role in persuading Park. Both men are now
dead, and only they know the full story, but I believe that Habib actually
threatened several actions. Among these was a total withdrawal of Ameri-
can support for Korea’s nuclear power program, including technical infor-
mation, training, and all existing loans and loan guarantees in support of
plant development. Further, Habib threatened a “complete review” of U.S.-
Korean security arrangements, including our nuclear umbrella. But if Presi-
dent Park agreed to cease his nuclear weapons program, these existing
programs would not only continue but also be enhanced and expanded.
In June, , President Park stated to the news media that South Korea
would be forced to develop its own nuclear weapons capability if the United
States withdrew its nuclear shield.^3 This statement caused a great outcry and
brought requests for clarification from several quarters. Some people inter-
preted this statement to be a veiled threat designed to force the United States
to continue its security guarantee to Korea—“or else.” In truth, I believe that
President Park was only stating in an indirect way the obvious alternative
solution to this problem—that as long as U.S. nuclear protection did extend
to Korea, he would abandon his plans to build atomic weapons.
The evidence from June, , forward strongly supports this conclusion.
By the fall of , our intelligence reports indicated that South Korea was
no longer investigating the world market for nuclear-related equipment, and
we had received private assurances that the Korean nuclear program was