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When this incident was reported to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), there was
some initial confusion. Gen. Richard L. Stilwell, then the USFK commander,
was in Japan at the time and immediately made arrangements to return to
Korea. By the time he returned, planning had already begun in Seoul and
in Washington for an appropriate response to the North Korean atrocity.
Because of this crisis and my background as a Korean specialist, I was
recalled from my normal duties and assigned temporarily to the intelligence
section of the emergency-action team for Korea, located in the Pentagon’s
National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). My job was to monitor North
Korean forces, with which I was familiar because of my recent experience
on the North Korean desk in the Army Intelligence Office.
After the initial meetings to determine how to respond, there were sev-
eral options to consider. One was to lodge a stern protest through the Mili-
tary Armistice Commission but to avoid any military retaliation. The second
option was to launch a limited military operation into North Korea. This
would not be a full-scale invasion force, but one that would have limited
objectives. It would nonetheless be a forceful, punitive raid designed to in-
flict casualties and provide a lesson to the North Koreans that they could
not get away with murder without serious and substantial retaliation. The
first option was rejected as too weak, the second as too strong. Eventually it
was decided that the best response would be one that had limited objectives,
did not run the chance of leading to all-out war, would still intimidate the
North Koreans, and get the message through that we were not playing
games. Both the USFK and the South Koreans began planning such an op-
eration, with support and assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in
Washington.
As finally approved, the plan had four elements. First, military forces in
Korea would be raised to a higher defense posture, Defense Condition
(DEFCON ). The purpose of this move was precautionary to some extent, but
our real hope was that by increasing our own readiness condition, the North
Koreans would move into defensive positions. By doing so they would be less
able to launch an attack. A few hours after we began moving our forces and
conducting the other activities associated with DEFCON , the North Koreans
took the bait. Their forces moved into their prepared defensive positions,
where they would need more time to mobilize and regroup if they intended
to take an offensive posture.
The second element was to greatly increase our intelligence coverage of
the North. Especially important for this was the role of our SR- high-alti-
tude spy planes. We flew numerous missions near the DMZ, which both