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double checked the targets that were preapproved for artillery bombardment
and airstrikes should these become necessary. One of the immediate targets
was a North Korean army barracks near the DMZ where most of the North
Korean Army’s reinforcements for the Panmunjom area were billeted. Dur-
ing this process, we noticed in the same general area as these barracks one
target that seemed to be a small cottage. On closer inspection I could iden-
tify this as the quarters of the Czech-Polish delegation, members of the so-
called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Somehow this structure
had made its way onto the target list. The error was immediately reported
to the operations section, and the cottage was removed from the target list.
With this important modification, the overall plan was approved for
execution.
Yet soon, difficulty arose between the JCS and USFK over command-and-
control issues. The JCS desired a direct communications link with the task
force commander, Maj. Gen. Morris Brady, who led the d Infantry Division.
General Stilwell was determined to resist such contact because he did not
want to run the risk of his field commanders getting direction from Wash-
ington without those orders going through him. To ensure that Washing-
ton would not be countermanding his orders, Stilwell instructed his staff to
refuse any attempt by the JCS or the White House to establish direct com-
munications with any of his subordinate units. This eventually resulted in
a rather heated argument between the JCS and USFK senior staffs, but Gen-
eral Stilwell held firm.
There was also an attempt by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to become di-
rectly involved. Ambassador Sneider had just returned to Korea from the
United States a few hours before the actual operation was scheduled to be-
gin. He took a chair in the bunker at Yongsan next to Stilwell, who was on
the telephone giving last-minute instructions to General Brady. Sneider at-
tempted to take the telephone from Stilwell’s hand and speak directly to
Brady. Stilwell held on to the telephone firmly, refusing to let go. Sneider
pulled, Stilwell pulled back. Finally Stilwell won. “Was there something you
wanted to ask General Brady?” asked Stilwell. Sneider gruffly replied, “Well,
I am the president’s personal representative in this operation.” Stilwell
smiled at Sneider and replied, “Of course, I will be happy to relay any ques-
tions from the president to my field commanders.”^6
Despite these competitions between the Pentagon and USFK and the
embassy and USFK, when the operation actually began, it was conducted
with skill and success. My experience has been that soldiers on the ground
can almost always be counted on to perform well as long as they are given