• good training, adequate resources, and strong leadership. That was again
true in this case. The combined ROK-U.S. task force entered the JSA at :
A.M. and by : A.M. was finished with its business. The tree was no more,
and there had been no resistance or violence from the North Koreans. The
story should have ended there, except for an incident involving General
Brady’s helicopter, which almost caused a disaster.
By virtue of being the d Division Commander, General Brady was also
the Paul Bunyan ground commander. In Vietnam it had not been uncom-
mon for helicopter pilots to fly low over the jungle in order to draw fire from
enemy forces. While this tactic had some value in Vietnam’s heavy jungles,
in the open terrain of Korea, it was both foolish and dangerous. Around ten
o’clock in the morning, long after the actual tree cutting had been completed
and the ground task force withdrawn, Brady ordered his command-and-
control helicopter to fly along the JSA close to the North Korean positions.
The North Koreans responded with automatic-weapons fire, hitting the air-
craft, which fortunately was able to return safely. This incident came dan-
gerously close to triggering our contingency plans for activating our artillery
fire and other counterattack forces. Later, USFK stated officially that Brady’s
helicopter had been on the southern side of the JSA and blamed the North
Koreans for the incident, but several eyewitnesses to the event believe his
helicopter was very close to or even over the line, and the North Koreans
might have had a legitimate right to fire at it.^7
Most Korean and American citizens only learned about this operation
after it was completed. They were told that it had been a great success. It
was successful, but squabbling between various elements over command
and control and Brady’s helicopter incident were omitted from or distorted
in official reports. We had an excellent plan that was well executed, but ex-
cept for some good luck, we could have had a serious military confronta-
tion on our hands.
Although my primary interest was in the military situation, particularly
regarding North Korean military forces and capabilities, I also was expected
to be knowledgeable concerning events that could cause instability in the
ROK. The U.S. government had several overriding interests in Korea, but the
primary concern was security. The major threat to security was North Ko-
rea, but the State Department was also concerned that human rights con-
ditions in the ROK under President Park would eventually result in internal
problems and instability. After nearly losing a presidential election to Kim Dae
Jung in , Park had imposed the authoritarian Yushin Constitution and
created what was close to a police state. The prevailing view in Washington