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CHAPTER 3

The Rise of the Troop-Withdrawal Issue

A

lthough the success of Operation Paul Bunyan demonstrated
the ability of the ROK and the United States to work together
in a military context, the mid-s was often a period of sus-
picion between the two countries, especially on the diplomatic
front. Much of this distrust can be traced to decisions made in Washington,
with minimal consultations with Seoul, yet having a direct effect on South
Korea. The Nixon administration’s unilateral withdrawal of one infantry
division from the peninsula in  is a prominent example. Unfortunately
the Carter administration’s policy toward Korea would be even worse.
Jimmy Carter ran for president at a time when the American public and
many in Congress searched for alternatives to the traditional Cold War di-
rection of U.S. foreign policy.^1 After over a generation of presidential domi-
nation in that area, the legislative branch reasserted itself. In addition to
cutting funds for support of the anticommunist regime in South Vietnam,
thus expediting its fall in April, , congressional reformers launched an
in-depth study of U.S. covert operations abroad and pushed for the adoption
of human rights criteria as a prerequisite for continued support to allied gov-
ernments. This development led to increasing criticism of the ROK, and as a
presidential candidate Carter sometimes joined in the attack. He even pro-
posed, over time, the removal of American ground troops from the peninsula.^2
Nonetheless, even after Carter was elected in November, , neither I
nor most of the people with whom I worked were greatly concerned about
relations with the ROK. We were fairly confident that once he was sworn in
as president and had access to more information, such as the secret intel-
ligence estimates of North Korean forces, he would not actually follow
through with his strict human rights policy. American politicians, as poli-
ticians in all democracies, have a habit of making many promises during
a political campaign that are impossible to keep after being elected. But
this case turned out to be different, and the result was a deterioration in
U.S.-Korean relations that would span the entire four years of the Carter
presidency.