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The Struggle BeginsPresident Carter began his term of office with some bad advice about the
Korean situation. Some of his advisers in the area were inexperienced and
had a built-in bias not just toward South Korea but all countries with a
military government. They tended to be extremely critical of the Park
government’s record on human rights but virtually ignored human rights
conditions in other countries, including North Korea. This attitude unfor-
tunately tended to blind them to the realities of the Korean peninsula, es-
pecially the importance of maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK security alliance.
The Carter team did not appear to take the North Korean military threat as
seriously as the Nixon and Ford administrations had, believing that, with
its strong and growing economy and well-trained military forces, the ROK
could provide most of the muscle for its own defense. Among those who may
have been influential were Jerome Cohen, a peace activist who played an
important role in drafting a portion of Carter’s campaign platform relating
to Asia, and retired Rear Adm. Gene LaRocque, who was a strong advocate
for the withdrawal of American ground forces from Korea.
Only a week after Carter’s inauguration on January , , the White
House forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the top-secret Presidential Re-
view Memorandum (PRM-).^3 This document asked for a military opin-
ion regarding which of three options was preferable for the withdrawal of
American ground forces from Korea. It is significant that PRM- did not
ask for an opinion from the JCS as to the military effect of such a withdrawal,
only which option was preferable. The three alternatives differed only in tim-
ing—one was immediate withdrawal, one was withdrawal over a two-year
period, and one was withdrawal over a four-year period. None was accept-
able to the JCS, which they reported to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.
After some additional consultation with the Joint Chiefs, however, Brown
informed the White House that the four-year option was the preferable of
the three.
The White House directed that U.S. Forces Korea was not to be consulted
on this matter. To not confer with the field commander on such an impor-
tant issue as this was almost unheard of. Speculation at the time was that
the Carter administration was trying to avoid alerting the South Korean
government that PRM- was being considered. Also, Gen. John W. Vessey
Jr., the USFK commander, was certain to be opposed to the withdrawal and
would fight it vigorously, so from the administration’s viewpoint, perhaps
the less he knew the better. In this Carter and his supporters were correct,