Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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als were identified worldwide and brought to Washington, sometimes at

considerable expense, to conduct the study.

The senior member of the study team was John Armstrong, a bright,

young West Point graduate, now a civilian, and he and his team worked

night and day, seven days a week, on the project. At the finish we had accu-

mulated a huge amount of information on North Korean forces and had

literally counted every tank, armored personnel carrier, and artillery piece

in their inventory. The results were astonishing—not only was the North

Korean Army significantly larger than the U.S. and ROK intelligence com-

munity had previously estimated but also its equipment inventory and de-

ployment pattern indicated conclusively that it was an offensive-oriented

force capable of attacking the South with little or no warning. The findings

were initially challenged by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the

CIA, but in every case our army analysts were able to conclusively defend

their findings, methodology, and conclusions.

The Washington bureaucracy churns out dozens of such intelligence

reports every year, but few of them have any lasting influence. This one was

different, partly because it was completed just before Carter entered the

White House and began pushing for troop withdrawals and also because

General Aaron had for months moved energetically behind the scenes to

ensure that it received widespread attention. I remember writing numer-

ous back-channel messages for him to senior officers in South Korea, the

Pacific area, allied counterpart organizations, and senior officials in Wash-

ington to communicate the results and orchestrate reactions. Thus, when

the final report emerged, it was not simply another in a large pile, but rather

a widely anticipated challenge to conventional wisdom.

When in March, , General Vessey reviewed the findings with Carter,

the president seemed impressed. It was during my dinner with the general

at Fort Leavenworth shortly thereafter that he stated his belief that the com-

mander in chief would seek further consultations with him before reach-

ing a final decision on troop withdrawal.^5

The Struggle Escalates

When Army Chief of Staff Bernard Rogers visited Korea late in April, how-

ever, there was no indication that troop withdrawal would be reconsidered.

In fact, at a private U.S.-only luncheon at Ambassador Sneider’s residence,

General Rogers stated that it was the common opinion in Washington that