- • congressional committee. At the end of the long day, which included more
than seven hours of testimony, Congressman Stratton, the chairman, an-
nounced that he would directly challenge the Carter troop-withdrawal plan.
Within days, columnists and editorial writers across America began to
question the wisdom of Carter’s policy.^11 The existence of our new intelli-
gence estimates began to leak out, and additional members of Congress
joined Stratton in criticizing the Carter plan. Congress was also concerned
that it had not been officially advised or consulted or had an opportunity to
debate or discuss the withdrawal plan. Interestingly these events occurred
as Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Philip Habib,
undersecretary of state for political affairs, consulted President Park on the
withdrawal issue in Seoul. They returned to submit a top-secret report em-
phasizing the need to assuage Korean concerns for “compensatory actions”
in the form of large-scale transfers of U.S. military equipment. Such trans-
fers would require congressional approval.^12 In stirring up a hornet’s nest
on Capitol Hill, the Singlaub affair was the best thing that could have hap-
pened for those of us opposed to troop reductions.
In fact, things were going so well after the Singlaub incident that it was
widely believed within Korean circles that Generals Singlaub and Vessey
actually conspired to set this scenario in motion. One story even said that
they had flipped a coin to determine who would sacrifice their career in or-
der to help defeat the Carter policy. Both men denied this story, but I do
strongly believe that the battle to overturn troop withdrawal would not have
been fought so ferociously had the administration been more honest and
open with the military about its plans. In this case, they were simply devi-
ous and untruthful about their real intentions.
For example, Carter and his staff, particularly Secretary of Defense Brown,
on several occasions indicated to the media and others that the JCS, who
were the president’s senior military advisers, had agreed with and supported
his policy. This was a misstatement. When PRM- was circulated, it had
only offered the three withdrawal options and had pointedly not asked for
an opinion as to the wisdom of the policy itself. Despite this the JCS had
volunteered their opposition. Brown, however, had reported to the White
House that the more lengthy withdrawal option had been the choice of the
JCS. Carter also had stated his intention to consult with General Vessey be-
fore making a final decision on the matter; he failed to do so. It was only
much later, and even then only after Congress forced policymakers to re-
examine the new intelligence data on North Korean forces, that Vessey’s
views received a full hearing.