Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

(Dana P.) #1

 •   


The final action that galvanized the military opposition to the Carter
withdrawal plan was the failure to be forthcoming and upfront on this
matter, either to the Korean government or to those who were charged with
the responsibility to carry out U.S. policies in Korea. Specifically, both USFK
and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul were officially informed in May, , that
no final decision had been reached on the troop reductions and that the
Habib-Brown visit to Korea in late May would be for the purpose of discuss-
ing and negotiating this issue with our Korean allies. In reality, President
Carter had already made the decision, having signed a decision memoran-
dum to that effect early in May, before the message announcing the visit of
Habib and Brown and without any prior consultation with the Korean gov-
ernment. In this way the Carter White House had not only misled the Ko-
rean government but also the senior American leadership in both USFK and
the embassy. I believe that this duplicity was one reason such dedicated offic-
ers as Generals Stilwell, Vessey, and Singlaub, in addition to others who were
working actively behind the scenes, were willing to forcefully confront the
White House.

Retaliation

Perhaps embarrassed by the public success of thwarting the withdrawal
plan, the Carter administration made several attempts to punish those who
had worked against it. General Singlaub was forced to retire a few months
after his removal as USFK chief of staff. General Stilwell suddenly found his
Pentagon privileges restricted and was denied the type of access and respect
normally afforded a former four-star officer and major commander. General
Vessey was suspected of being involved in sabotaging the troop-withdrawal
plan and was “punished” in a very unusual way.
Following his assignment to Korea, General Vessey’s name was put forth
to be chief of staff of the U.S. Army. Although the president formally nomi-
nates the officer for this position, in all but the most unusual cases, he ac-
cepts the recommendation of the army’s senior leadership. In this case
Vessey was the army’s overwhelming choice. Carter, however, had different
plans. When Vessey’s name reached his desk, Carter abruptly summoned
him to Washington for a personal interview. The general, who was still in
Korea at the time, flew for sixteen hours directly to Washington and reported
immediately to the White House. At the “interview” Carter asked Vessey
what he thought about his troop-withdrawal plan, which by this time was
dying a slow but certain death. The general replied truthfully, stating that
Free download pdf