- • he believed the plan was a mistake and hoped it would not become policy.
Carter then asked him what his original goals had been when he entered
the army. Vessey, who had entered the army during World War II at the rank
of private, replied that his original goal had been to become a First Sergeant.
The president then indicated that the interview was over; it had lasted about
five minutes. Vessey, having no further business in Washington, returned
to his airplane and flew the sixteen hours back to Korea.^13
Carter subsequently chose Edward Meyer, one of Vessey’s former subor-
dinates and a three-star officer, to be chief of staff. He then offered the job as
vice chief of staff to Vessey, probably with the expectation that the general
would retire. Instead, Vessey accepted the position and served with great
distinction as the army’s number-two man. After Carter was defeated in the
next election, Ronald Reagan elevated General Vessey to chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest position a military officer can hold. He also
appointed General Stilwell deputy undersecretary of defense for interna-
tional security policy. General Singlaub became an unofficial adviser and
consultant to the Reagan administration on a number of issues.
The Civilian SideNot all the opposition to Carter’s withdrawal policy was confined to the U.S.
military. There were several key members of the president’s own staff who,
once in place and better educated as to the true Korean situation, also voiced
opposition. Their disagreement was less obvious and open than that of men
such as Stilwell and Singlaub, but it was at least equally effective.
The major civilian players in this drama were Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Morton Abramowitz, and National
Security Council Staffer Michael Armacost. All three were Carter political
appointees. Of the three, Holbrooke, a fierce bureaucratic infighter who
chaired the Interagency Group on East Asia, was the most active in quietly
working to reverse the policy.^14
Intra-administration opposition to troop reductions was not based di-
rectly on the Korean situation or concern over North Korea’s military
strength. Instead, it was based on regional political considerations.
Holbrooke and others believed that withdrawal from Korea would send sig-
nals of U.S. weakness in Asia at precisely the time when we should be dis-
playing strength. American strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region
were increasing. The relationship with China was rapidly developing, and